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Chapter 1 
BRECKINRIDGE LONG 
Breckinridge Long became the head of the Special War 
Problems Division of the State Department in January 
1940. He took the post of Assistant Secretary of State 
recently vacated by George Messersmith when the latter 
became the ambassador to Cuba.: The War Problems 
Division was established in January 1940 and included 
supervision of the Visa Division." The new Assistant 
Secretary, therefore, was charged with handling all 
problems related to refugees including formulating 
policies to determine who and how many of those seeking 
freedom from persecution would be permitted refuge in the 
United States. 
Long's credentials were impressive. Born in 1881 in 
St. Louis, Missouri and the descendent of the 
'Extract from Memorandum of Secretary Hull's Press 
Conference, 5 January 1940, container 202, Papers of 
Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress. Hereafter 
referred to as Long Papers. 
-Richard Breitmann and Alan M. Kraut, American 
Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987), 126. 
1 
2 
distinguished Long family of North Carolina and the 
equally respectable Breckinridge family of Kentucky, Long 
graduated from Princeton University in 1904 and was 
admitted to law practice in Missouri in 1906. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to gain election to the Missouri 
State Assembly in 1908, Long returned to the study of 
constitutional law at Princeton, taking courses from 
Woodrow Wilson, and received his master's degree from 
Princeton in 1909. His return to Missouri politics was 
enhanced by his marriage to the granddaughter of Francis 
Preston Blair, a leader of the Jacksonian wing of the 
Democratic party in the mid-nineteenth century, and by 
his early support of Woodrow Wilson in the campaign for 
the Presidency in 1912. Although opposed by William 
Jennings Bryan in his bid to gain an appointment as Third 
Assistant Secretary of State, Long bided his time. 
Following Bryan's resignation. Long's career took an 
upward swing, undoubtedly aided by a loan of $100,000 
that he gave to the almost bankrupt Democratic National 
Committee in 1916. Long's reward was an appointment as 
the Third Secretary of State in 1917. After three years 
of diligent work in the State Department and careful 
recruitment of several young Missouri Democrats to 
federal positions in Washington, Long, the faithful 
Wilsonian, resigned from the State Department in order to 
3 
campaign for the League of Nations and attempt to win a 
seat in the U. S. Senate in 1920. Long left Missouri 
politics following his defeat and "retired" to Maryland 
where he devoted his time to travel, national Democratic 
Party affairs, and the breeding and racing of horses. In 
1930 he met and became a supporter of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and contributed heavily to Roosevelt's pre- 
convention campaign in 1932. He was rewarded with an 
appointment as the Ambassador to Italy in 1933, a post 
that he held until 1936. He remained in semi-retirement 
for almost four years.3 
During his service as Ambassador to Italy, Long 
evolved from a novice to a seasoned diplomat. At first 
he wrote to Roosevelt about being "part of a big show"4 
in which he met monarchs and princes. Long's naivete led 
him at first to endorse the Italian corporate state as 
the "most interesting experiment in government" since the 
3Fred L. Israel, ed.. The War Diary of Breckinridqe 
Long: Selections From the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), xi-xxv. Hereafter 
referred to as Israel, ed.. War Diary. 
4Long .to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 June 1933, 
container 105, Long Papers. Mrs. Long, whom William E. 
Dodd, the Ambassador to Germany, described as "a 
descendant of the famous Blair family . . . and very 
conscious of the fact," entertained lavishly, and both 
Longs seemed impressed by the fact that they were 
included in the high social circles of Fascist Italy. 
William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd, Ambassador Dodd's 
Diary, 1933-1938 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1941), 11-12. 
4 
founding of the U. S. government in the 18th century and 
to praise Mussolini as an "outstanding character" who had 
brought law, order, and cleanliness to Italy.5 Two years 
later, however. Long's opinion about the Fascists had 
changed and he described them as a group who were 
"deliberate, determined, obdurate, ruthless, and 
vicious."6 Illness required a return to the United 
States for an operation and forced Long to vacate his 
post in Italy, but Roosevelt clearly indicated that he 
wanted Long to continue in his second administration once 
Long was well.7 
Long's position as Assistant Secretary and 
particularly as the Director of the Special War Problems 
Division of the State Department provides an ample 
opportunity to analyze the implementation of U. S. 
immigration and refugee policies between 1940 and 1944 
(when the War Refugee Board was created). Although his 
appointment was at first a personal disappointment 
because he had wanted a cabinet level post, Long readily 
accepted the offer to fill the Assistant Secretary 
5Long to Roosevelt, 1 June 1933, container 105, Long 
Papers. 
6Long to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 September 1935, 
container 115, Long Papers. 
7Franklin D. Roosevelt to Long, 22 June 1936, 
container 117, Long Papers. 
5 
appointment.8 He was pleased with the opportunity 
finally to be in a position to have a hand in the 
determination of State Department policy,9 but he was not 
happy with his responsibilities regarding refugee issues. 
He described those responsibilities as the "worst job in 
Government" and he would continue to maneuver for a 
better position in the State Department.10 
In the beginning of his term as Assistant Secretary, 
Long was ambivalent in his opinions about the 
authoritarian regimes of Italy and Germany. While he did 
not depart from his belief that Mussolini and the 
Fascists were "obdurate, ruthless, and vicious," Long 
still admired the ability of the Fascists and Nazis to 
mobilize their people. The Germans, he wrote in 1938, 
were the only people with the "intelligence, courage, and 
8Both Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull supported 
Long's appointment as the Assistant Secretary because 
they were impressed with the work that he had done for 
the Department in regard to the attempts by the Special 
Problems Division in 193 9 to promote peace with Italy and 
to stabilize the international trade situation. 
Memorandum of Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of 
State, 1944, container 204, Long Papers. See also Long 
Diary, 31 March 1939, container 5, Long Papers. The 
portion of Longs' diary pertinent to this paper is in 
container 5; therefore all future references will be 
labeled as Long Diary. 
9
,Israel, ed.. War Diary, xxiv; Long Diary, 31 March 
1939 and 27 July 1939. 
10Long Diary, 13 and 26 September 1943, 24 January 
1944 . 
6 
obedience sufficient to bring order, system and 
comparative peace in that whole country lying between the 
Rhine and the Black Sea [sic] ."11 His political thinking 
after 1938 closely resembled the appeasement approach of 
the Cliveden set in Britain which hoped that Nazi Germany 
would concentrate its attention on Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. In February 193 9 he wrote in his diary 
that Hitler did not want a war with France but was 
instead more interested in moving eastward because "no 
one is going to fight him there."12 As late as June 1939 
Long still believed that the United States should take a 
careful approach in its diplomacy with Germany lest it 
become the "champion of a defeated cause."13 
It appeared that Long was willing to accept almost 
anything but war with Germany. He privately labelled 
Roosevelt's criticism of Hitler's expansionism as 
"terrible," something that "will get us into war." He 
also questioned the efficacy of an embargo on steel, oil, 
and iron to Japan, Lend Lease, and Roosevelt's "Hand That 
Held the Dagger" speech condemning Italy for its actions 
against France.14 
"ibid., 13 March 1938. 
12Ibid. , 3 February 1939. 
13Ibid., 13 June 1939. 
14Ibid., 16 June, 12 November 1940. 
7 
Long and his associates were in close agreement on 
the issue of the refugees. His determination to analyze 
every word of an immigrant's credentials, for example, 
was sustained by his subordinates, viewed by some as 
"suave anti-Semites." In their New York Evening Post 
article, journalists Tabitha Petain and William Walton 
wrote that Long readily admitted that Consuls Leland 
Morris in Berlin and James Stewart in Zurich were anti- 
Semites who were loathe to issue visas to Jews. Yet, 
Petain and Walton noted. Long did nothing in the period 
before the entry of the United States into the War to 
remove the two Consuls from their important positions.15 
In another instance, Avra Warren, the head of the Visa 
Division of the State Department, opposed the settlement 
of 12,000 Jewish refugees in the underpopulated Virgin 
Islands on the ground that many were either subversives 
or operatives of the German government. He also opposed 
the use of Alaska as a possible site for Jewish refugees 
because they were all of the same background and might 
therefore cause trouble.16 Robert Alexander, Warren's 
assistant, held similar views regarding Jewish refugees. 
He consistently opposed the creation from unused quotas 
1511 February 1941, New York Evening Post, 7. 
16Long Memorandum, 13 November, container 211, Long 
Papers. Avra Warren to Hackworth, Legal Division, 9 
February 1941, ibid. 
8 
of what he termed in 1944 "a jackpot for the Jews."17 
The year before Alexander had suggested to Long that the 
Jews in the United States were unwittingly helping Hitler 
by interfering with the success of the Allied war effort 
by their unreasonable refugee demands.18 George Brant, 
Long's executive assistant and delegate to the 1938 Evian 
Refugee Conference and the 1943 Bermuda Conference, 
expressed similar sentiments. Brant and Elbridge Durbow, 
Chief of the State Department's European Division, would 
not give credence to reports of mass exterminations in 
Europe. And, finally, R. Borden Reams, who became as 
early as 1942 Long's principal advisor on the Jewish 
refugee situation in the European Division of the State 
Department, apparently convinced Long that many of the 
refugees who came to the United States were in actuality 
spies for the Nazis.19 
There appeared to be little difference between 
the State Department refugee policy and the personalities 
and ideologies of Long and his assistants. The policy 
17Alexander to Long, 2 February 1944, container 215, 
Long Papers. 
18Alexander to Long, 7 May 1943, container 203, Long 
Papers. 
"Although Reams' influence is not specifically 
cited. Long closely followed the logic and wording that 
Reams used in his recommendations to Long. See American 
Minutes of the Bermuda Conference sessions, 25 April 
1943, container 202, Long Papers. 
9 
followed by Long in the State Department (and he 
considered himself the "policy making and the executive 
agent of the Government" in matters relating to 
refugees)20 was one which closed the door to refugees, 
children as well as adults, who were attempting to flee 
from Nazi terrorism. 
Evidence supports the suspicion that Long did not 
need much persuasion from his subordinates to accept the 
fact that the admission of a large number of Jewish 
refugees in the United States would be dangerous to the 
nation. Following his reading of Mein Kampf in 1938, 
Long wrote in his diary that Hitler was "eloquent in 
opposition to Jewry and the Jews as exponents of 
Communism and chaos" [italics mine].21 As Assistant 
Secretary, Long modified the rhetoric but not the essence 
of his feelings about the Jews. He consistently 
complained in his diary about the "radical boys" who were 
"refugee enthusiasts" and labeled them as [Felix] 
"Frankfurter's boys" because they were "representative of 
his racial group and philosophy" [italics mine] .22 
20Long Diary, 29 December 1940. 
21Ibid. , 6 February 1938. 
22Ibid., 15 February 1941, 9 December 1942, and 4 
September 1943. 
10 
There also is evidence that Long became increasingly- 
convinced of a concerted effort afoot to undermine his 
authority and influence within the Roosevelt 
administration. This might have been expected after 
several years of dealing with the complex problem of the 
refugees and their advocates, but Long expressed his 
suspicions almost from the beginning. He complained in 
his diary in 1940 that the "attack in the newspapers 
still seems to continue against me little by little and 
indicate that the wild-eyed elements have marked me out 
as their objective."23 A year later Long was convinced 
that Rabbi Wise, Attorney General Francis Biddle, and 
James McDonald of the President's Advisory Committee on 
Political Refugees (PACPR), "in their eagerness to 
destroy" him, were ready to "throw him to the wolves." 
He was certain that they would "try in the future as they 
have in the past" to destroy him and "ruin" his 
"political status."24 In that same 1941 diary entry, 
Long wrote that despite his exhaustion he would continue 
to battle against his enemies despite the fact that "each 
one of these men [Wise, McDonald, and Biddle] hate me" 
because. Long explained, they believed that "every 
person, everywhere, has a right to come to the United 
23Ibid., 9 December 1940. 
24Ibid., 4 September 1941. 
States" while he believed that "nobody, anywhere has a 
right to enter the United States unless the United States 
desires . "2S 
Long was convinced that many of the people who 
entered the United States, especially by way of New York 
City, were the supporters of ideas that were definitely 
un-American and he had no doubt, he wrote in his diary, 
that they were not like the people with whom he 
associated and worked.26 Described by Saul Friedman in 
No Haven For The Oppressed as a "wizened" man who 
"possessed little fondness for the common man or the 
foreigner,"27 Long evoked strong reactions from those who 
had to deal with him. For example. Long himself wrote 
that James MacDonald, the Chairman of the PACPR, walked 
out of an October 1940 meeting with Long after he accused 
Long of having a "vindictive mentality and superlative 
[sic] ego."28 Tabitha Petain and William Walton, in 
25Ibid. Long did not hide his feelings. At a 
meeting with Rabbi Wise, Biddle, the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of New Orleans, McDonald, and President 
Roosevelt, Long openly opposed their position that more 
refugees should be allowed to enter the United States. 
Roosevelt remained quiet on the issue. Ibid. 
26Ibid., 16 December 1940. 
27Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United 
States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1973), 114-115. 
28Long Diary, 3 October 1940. 
12 
their New York Evening Post article, described Long as a 
"narrow, limited, man, whose wealth and inclination have 
kept him from ever having any sympathy for the people who 
get pushed around." Although they conceded that he "may 
no longer admire the fascist way of life" [italic added], 
they also wrote that his "contempt for the little people" 
made "his holding of any government position a danger to 
American democracy" [italic added].29 
Opinions differ regarding Long's motives in those 
crucial four years in which he engaged in the "war in the 
immigration fight." There are those who have claimed 
that Long exhibited at times an extreme paranoia in 
conjunction with a dislike for and suspicion of refugees 
in general.30 
One thing is certain: for Long the key could be 
found in the phrase "observing the requirements of our 
law." The law prevailed even in the case of refugee 
29New York Evening Post, 11 February 1941, 7. 
30Friedman, No Haven, 118; Henry L. Feingold, The 
Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the 
Holocaust New York: Holocaust Library, 1980), 135; David 
S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the 
Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Press, 1985), 
191; Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy , 126- 
127; Yehuda Bauer. The Holocaust in Historical 
Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1978), 78, [Bauer went as far as to describe Long as a 
"pathological antisemite," 215] ; Deborah Lipstadt, in 
Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the 
Holocaust. 1933-1945 (New York: The Free Press, 1986) . 
13 
children.31 He was against legislation which would amend 
the Neutrality Act and allow American vessels to bring 
children from Britain or "war stricken areas" because 
this would have enabled children from other countries as 
well to be brought to the United States and, he 
concluded, would lead to the "vitiation of our 
immigration laws."32 Indeed, Saul Friedman has contended 
that Long's "rigid adherence" to the law was one of the 
major reasons why the Jewish community grew to dislike 
Long and see him as their enemy.33 
31See Long Diary, 19 June 1940 and 12 July 1940. 
32Long Diary, 13 August 1940. 
33Friedman, No Haven, 117. 
Chapter 2 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Breckinridge Long was not the inventor of the United 
States policy on immigration. The policy he inherited 
had been in a process of development since the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and it is the subject 
of this chapter. The modifications that were made during 
Long's tenure as Assistant Secretary of State will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Prior to the twentieth century the flow of 
immigrants into American depended more upon the economic 
situation of Europe and the United States than upon any 
legislative limitations imposed by the United States 
Congress. Immigration was thought of as a natural process 
which aided the immigrant and the American society as 
well. It was not until 1882 that Congress, following the 
lead of several individual state legislatures, excluded 
certain types of immigrants (convicts, lunatics, idiots, 
and paupers). Three years later, Congress extended the 
14 
15 
restriction of immigrants to contract labor immigrants as 
well.1 
The restriction of Oriental immigration was the 
first definite change in the American policy of free 
immigration.2 Although the initial arguments used for 
Asiatic exclusion were economic, the rationale was soon 
delivered in "racial" terms.3 This was also the first 
time either race or ethnic identity was used as a means 
to exclude a group of people from immigration, an 
argument which was later used in an attempt to bar 
immigration from eastern and southern Europe.4 
During the 1890s demand for immigration restriction 
increased. This increase was based on ethnic as well as 
economic grounds. The passage of the Literacy Test Act 
of 1917 was the movement's first success and marked a 
transition in the laws governing American immigration. 
Although appearing to conform to the idea of individual 
■'Roy Garis, Immigration Restriction (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1927), 88; George M. Stephenson, A History 
of American Immigration (New York: Ginn and Company, 
1926), 143. 
2William S. Bernard, American Immigration Policy: A 
Reappraisal (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 7, 8, 
11. 
3Garis, Immigration Restriction. 290-91; see also 
18-23 . 
4M. R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1909), 96. 
16 
selection by requiring the applicant simply to meet a 
standard of literacy, its purpose clearly was to reduce 
the number of certain immigrants into the country5 -- 
specifically those from southeastern Europe where the 
illiteracy rate was high.6 Immigration restriction was 
supported by both political parties and by many of the 
leaders in the American business community. Although 
President Wilson twice (1915, 1917) vetoed measures 
similar to the literacy test bill,7 he also proclaimed 
the idea of "100 per cent American" in warning against 
the "hyphenated" American who might have dual loyalty. 
"Return to Normalcy" was the slogan that defined the 
early years of the 1920s. The term has been given 
several interpretations, and in the realm of immigration 
William S. Bernard described it as a "return to the 
conservatism and traditionalism of the closed society and 
to a climate of opinion extraordinarily favorable to the 
reversal of our historic open-door policy of 
immigration." This normalcy, according to Bernard, 
5Henry Pratt Fairchild, Immigration (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1925), 383. 
sRobert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 5. 
7Stephenson, A History of Immigration, 153, 166-69. 
17 
resulted in the Quota Law and the National Origins Law.8 
The adoption of the quota system in the 1920s was the 
result of the movement for the restriction of emigration 
to the United States, the increasing sentiment for 
"independent internationalism," and the general feeling 
of insecurity in the years following World War I. 
The quota system formed only one part of the total 
immigration policy and was established to operate in 
conjunction with the basic immigration law of 1917. 
Another important regulatory device was the visa 
requirement of the State Department also included in the 
1924 Act. According to that law, immigrants must secure 
a visa, a process requiring documentation with respect to 
identity, character, and the financial standing of the 
applicant. This proved itself an effective means of 
screening immigrants, but the requirements also increased 
bureaucratic entanglement.9 Indeed, such entanglements 
became extremely frustrating to those who needed 
immediate attention, such as during the years of Nazi 
domination of Europe. 
The years prior to World War II saw a slight 
increase in the number of immigrants who came to the 
8Bernard, American Immigration Policy: A 
Reappraisal, 19. 
9Ibid. , 30. 
18 
United States, reflecting the discriminatory policies of 
the Nazis. There was not, however, a change in the 
immigration policy of the United States. Even the 
provision which required guarantees from immigrant 
sponsors (individual and group) against refugees becoming 
public charges was maintained, and between 1933 and 1944 
less than 250,000 refugees were admitted to this 
country.10 This number represents the smallest flow of 
immigration for any comparable period since 1830.11 
If the intent of the National Origins Act was to 
reduce immigration, then it achieved its goal. But, like 
most laws, it managed to create problems while meeting 
its goal. The official quota system simply ignored the 
political realities of Europe. The law was not flexible 
enough to address those realities. By permitting only a 
10 percent increase of a country's quota in any one month 
and by forbidding the transfer of unused quota from other 
countries from year to year, the law, when strictly 
adhered to, proved to be a tragedy during the years of 
Nazi persecution. This lack of flexibility resulted in 
quotas remaining largely unused. William Bernard has 
10Ibid. , 33. 
"Maurice A. Davie, Refugees in America (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1947), 33-36. 
19 
insisted that this was the greatest failure of the 
National Origins Act.12 
There were other limitations to the National Origins 
Act. It failed to consider the changes in populations 
and boundaries that took place between the wars. It 
never defined what the characteristics should be for a 
prospective U.S. citizen other than they should not be 
public charges. 
And, most importantly, Bernard claims, the law gave 
government sanction to an unscientific and 
dangerous racialist [sic] doctrine. It allows 
'nativist' enemies of our democracy to carry on 
their subversive activities under the cloak of 
government policy. At home the law makes for 
disunity rather than for unity, and abroad it 
exposes us to the charge of hypocrisy before 
the nations of the world for our failure to 
translate democratic principles into 
practice.13 
The law was based upon an interpretation that relied upon 
the concept of "differential assimilation," a concept 
which argued that some ethnic groups (meaning those from 
the northern and western parts of Europe) possessed a 
superior ability to adapt to the society of the United 
States. No reputable studies exist supporting such an 
assumption. Moreover, the concept was based upon the 
erroneous belief that assimilation and adaptation meant 
12Bernard, American Immigration Policy, 260-61. 
13Ibid. , 262. 
20 
the complete loss of the cultural identity by those who 
were "assimilated."14 
Actually, 1929 was a turning point in relation to 
the immigration policy of the United States. The 
Depression created a different criteria, one that was 
based more upon economic considerations than cultural 
ones. Many of those who had opposed immigration 
restriction reluctantly concluded that restriction was 
perhaps necessary. They agreed with the restrictionists 
that the flow of immigrants should be reduced, but not by 
the inception of new and harsher laws. These new 
restrictionists favored strict enforcement of the 
existing laws to achieve similar ends.15 The importance 
in the methods suggested by each of these two groups 
sJnould not go unnoticed. Further restriction by 
legislative act could have resulted in a permanent policy 
while administrative policy changes which were 
restrictive could be modified should the economic 
situation improve. A bill was proposed by the extreme 
retrictionists which would have lowered the quota. It 
was actively opposed by several Jewish organizations and 
President Herbert Hoover, who had previously submitted 
the problem to the State Department, had decided to 
"Ibid., 265. 
15Divine, American Immigration Policy, 77. 
21 
restrict immigration through adherence to existing 
administrative policies. The bill failed.16 
Rigid adherence could, however, have its own 
negative effect. Consuls now interpreted the "likely to 
become a public charge" clause of the 1917 Act as to mean 
only the most prosperous European emigrants.17 This 
policy had a drastic result. By February of the 
following year, European immigration had been reduced by 
90 percent.18 A year later, however, Samuel 
Dickstein,19 Chairman of the House Immigration Committee, 
attempted to get a bill passed that would have created a 
federal board to review cases of immigrants who had been 
denied entrance but who had relatives in the United 
States.20 The bill did not become law, but the State 
Department, sensitive to criticism that it was receiving, 
liberalized its policies concerning prospective 
16Ibid. , 85. 
17New York Times, 10 September 1930, 1. 
18Divine, American Immigration Policy, 78-79. 
19Conqressional Record (6 January 1931): 1501. 
20
"Review of the Action of Consular Officers in 
Refusing Immigration Visas," Hearings Before the 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of 
Representatives, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, (1932), 2-7, 
9, 10; Regarding Dickstein see also New York Times, 12 
October 1931, 18. 
22 
immigrants who had relatives in the United States.21 
This was not, however, a major change in State Department 
policy, for, other than a "slight relaxation" in 1937 of 
its policy concerning the interpretation of its "public 
charge" policy, the State Department retained a policy of 
strict adherence to administrative procedures through the 
remainder of the decade.22 
These, then were some of the problems that refugees 
from Nazi persecution faced. Until 1935, however, many 
German Jews felt little need to worry personally about 
the refugee policies of the United States. The passage 
of the Nuremburg Laws in 1935 caused many German Jews to 
reconsider their situation. Initially, little 
apprehension was felt by German Jews who wished to 
emigrate because there was a network of Jewish 
organizations in Germany, Palestine, and the United 
States available to help those who wished to leave 
Germany. Most of the leaders of these organizations 
believed that the problem of emigration could be solved 
in approximately fifteen years. It soon became apparent 
21Ibid., 11-14; Congressional Record (1 June 1932), 
11, 715; State Department, Press Release 10 (14 April 
1934) : 204 . 
"Congressional Record (23 January 1939): 609; 
"Deportation of Aliens," Hearings Before a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate, 
1st Session, (21-23 March 1939): 71. 
23 
that the task was greater than anticipated.23 German 
laws made it difficult for Jews to leave the country and 
take their wealth with them. Nations which previously 
had received Jewish immigrants now placed barriers of red 
tape in the way of refugees. Resettlement became less 
attainable.24 
Despite these difficulties, the hope for 
resettlement remained at least until the pogrom of 9 
November 1938. Kristallnacht, the Night of Broken Glass, 
could not be ignored as a simple aberration. 
Kristallnacht left few Jews in Germany untouched and the 
results -- physical, psychological, and material -- were 
disastrous.25 Efforts toward the organization of Jewish 
emigration either were blocked by Nazi officials or 
23
"German Economic Notes. Forfeiture of Possessions 
by Jewish Emigrants." Dispatch from Harrison Lewis, 
Legation Secretary, Bern Switzerland, 14 January 1942. 
container 202, Long Papers; see also Sir John Hope 
Simpson, The Refugee Problem: A Report of a Survey 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and 
Oxford University Press, 1939), 135, 146. 
24Lewis and Marian Shibsby, "Status of the Refugee 
Under the American Immigration Laws," The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 203 
(May 193 9): 76. 
25Sir John Hope Simpson, Refugees: A Review of the 
Situation Since September 1938 (New York: Farrar and 
Rinehart, Inc., 1939), 111. 
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failed in the confusion and hysteria of the next few 
weeks .26 
When Germany occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia in 
1938 and 1939, close to 300,000 non-German Jews came 
under Nazi control. The number of Jews who left Germany 
between 1933 and 1938 is estimated to be 150, 000.27 
Following Nazi occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia 
through 1939, the number became nearly 400,000 refugees, 
according to League of Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Sir Herbert Emerson. Of this 400,000, 329,000 
were Jewish with 215,000 from Germany, 97,000 from 
Austria, and 17,000 from Czechoslovakia.28 And, as Nazi 
Germany continued to expand through Europe, the problem 
became only more nightmarish.29 
Increasingly European Jews no longer had a place to 
go on the continent. If they fled eastward they often 
faced a treatment as dangerous as the one they were 
26For Nazi pressure upon Jews to emigrate 
immediately, New York Times, 27 April 1938, 11. 
27Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, "Private and 
Governmental Aid of Refugees," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 2 03 (May 193 9): 
41. 
28Tartakower and Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee, 32. 
29Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 126, 136. In despair 
many Jews committed suicide; see New York Times, 23 March 
1938, 8. Many Jews were exiled from the Reich without 
proper papers or supplies. See New York Times, 3 April 
1938, 1, 36; 20 April 1938, 1; 21 April 1938, 10, 18. 
25 
attempting to escape. In the west the situation differed 
only in degree: in France, which interned 15,000 in 1939, 
Jews were treated as "enemy aliens;" Great Britain 
interned another 27,000 "enemy aliens" [Jewish refugees 
fleeing Nazi Germany and Nazi gained territory] during 
the collapse of France in 1940.30 The United States 
toughened its alien registration procedure, especially 
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Prior to World War I the United States had been able 
to absorb vast numbers of refugees because of its immense 
resources and extensive and developed productive economy. 
Following World War I an unfavorable economic climate 
combined with an increasing American nativism contributed 
to a restrictive immigration policy. Although American 
nativism showed no abatement in the late 193 0s, the 
economic situation improved dramatically. The economic 
situation in the United States improved enough by the 
beginning of the war in 1939 to render moot the argument 
of the restrictionist whose opposition had been based 
solely on economic grounds. An argument was made that 
the thousands of refugees who wished to enter the United 
30Tartakower and Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee, 33. 
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States could contribute significantly to the labor force 
that was needed to meet the demands placed by war.31 
One characteristic of past Jewish immigration to the 
United States, however, served as a deterrent. Past 
Jewish immigrants settled in large cities, particularly 
New York City where two million of the seven million 
inhabitants were Jews.32 The question became how many 
more Jews New York City either could absorb or was 
willing to absorb. Accordingly, most of the refugee aid 
societies encouraged settlement throughout the United 
States and not just in the large urban centers.33 
Readjustment by refugees to the United States was a 
"stubborn problem." There was no program, as in 
Palestine, designed to help the refugee move into another 
occupation. Also, refugees who came to the United States 
tended to be older, more concentrated in the white collar 
professions, and less willing than those who emigrated to 
Palestine to change occupations. Another acute problem 
was the fact that millions of Germans had settled in 
America and many of these resided in the same communities 
31New York Times, 3 February 1942, 11; 7 February 
1942, 10. 
32Ibid., Long Diary, 11 January 1944, Container 5, 
Long Papers. 
33Dan Rosenberg, "Resettling German Refugees Outside 
of New York," The Jewish Social Service Quarterly 4 
(December 1938): 254 ff. 
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as the Jewish refugees. The Jewish refugees considered 
those German immigrants as their "ideological enemies" 
since many of the German immigrants had achieved 
substantial success, exerted a considerable amount of 
political "influence," and were the source of a 
considerable portion of the anti-refugee propaganda in 
the United States. Although the outbreak of the war 
quelled some of the activities of the German immigrants, 
it did not erase completely the influence of the German 
immigrant community.34 
The logistical problems were not insurmountable. 
The highly developed social work organizations, 
particularly the special refugee-serving institutions, 
were common in the American Jewish community and had 
successfully served to facilitate the adjustment process 
for immigrants in the past. These organizations could 
have coped with the non-German Jewish refugee problem. 
The local and federated landsmannschaften also played an 
important role in aiding the refugee. These societies of 
Jews from various European countries kept in close 
contact with their homelands and maintained aid to 
refugees from those areas. Although there was no 
comparable organization for German-American Jews, the 
German-American Jewish community revealed an intense 
34Tartakower and Grossmann, The Jewish Refugees. 84. 
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enough concern for their heritage to devote considerable 
effort to refugee-aid activities.35 
Yet, for the Jewish refugee, the United States 
apparently provided the best possible hope in a situation 
where little hope existed. The records of the 
naturalization agencies can act as a testament to the 
fact that German-Jewish refugees believed that the United 
States was to be their new homeland: they were the 
largest group of all immigrant groups to apply for United 
States citizenship.36 
35Tartakower and Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee. 82. 
"Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 467. 
Chapter 3 
THE EMERGENCY VISA QUAGMIRE 
It was understandable that refugees from Nazi 
persecution looked to the United States for relief. Yet, 
it also was obvious that the expected relief and support 
would not be forthcoming if the State Department decided 
to follow its traditional immigration and refugee aid 
policies. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that by July 1940 
committees supporting aid to refugees sprang up 
throughout the United States. The President's Advisory 
Committee on Political Refugees (PACPR), acting as an 
umbrella organization for all refugee aid societies, 
assumed the responsibility of facilitating the issuance 
of emergency visitors' visas, immigration visas, and 
transit certificates to refugees who were imperiled in 
Spain, Portugal, Southern France, and the French African 
colonies of Morocco and Tunis. Under the agreement 
reached on 26 July 1940 between officials of the PACPR, 
the Justice Department, and the State Department, 
requests for special emergency visas went first to the 
29 
30 
PACPR in New York City which confirmed each recommended 
person's character and confirmed the purpose for coming 
to the United States. All approved applications were 
sent to the Justice Department for clearance and to the 
State Department to determine the possibilities that the 
applicant might engage in activity "inimical to the 
United States." If the applicant were approved, the State 
Department notified the nearest consul to the applicant 
and the visa was issued.1 
Visitors' visas had to be issued because most of the 
national quotas had been filled and visitors' visas could 
be issued without reference to a quota. While the 
visitors' visa requirements were quite often beneficial 
to those wishing to leave Germany and German occupied 
territory, problems existed that could prove to be 
insurmountable. In the sixteen years following the 
passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, the U. S. government 
had required that a visitor to the United States must 
have proof of the ability either to return to his or her 
native land or to visit another country. The Roosevelt 
administration could (and often did in extraordinary 
circumstances) waive those requirements as long as it 
^ong Diary, 3 October 1940; David Wyman, Paper 
Walls: American Refugee Policy and the Refugee Crisis. 
1938-1941 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1968), 139; Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy 
and European Jewry, 129. 
31 
upheld the public charge, physical, mental, moral, and 
other qualifications of the 1917 Act.2 
The administration suspended the six month 
limitation on visitors' visas, but it made it clear that 
refugees under the visitors' visas would have to leave 
the United States as soon as possible. Two months after 
the State Department adopted that policy, a worried Long 
wrote to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle that 
the emergency visa program was "a departure from long- 
established interpretation of the immigration law in 
order that visitors' visas and transit certificates could 
be issued to refugees desiring to come here and who will 
probably remain in this country."3 
In order to receive an emergency visa, the applicant 
had to include the usual affidavit of financial support 
from a resident of the United States guaranteeing that 
the visitor would not become a public charge. A "moral 
affidavit" was also necessary, attesting to the good 
character of the prospective visitor and describing the 
applicant's past political activities. An applicant also 
had to give some evidence that he or she was in imminent 
2Wyman, Paper Walls, 13 9, 14 0. 
3Long to Adolf A Berle, Jr., 7 February 1941, 
container 211, Long Papers. 
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danger and that temporary residence would pose no threat 
to the United States.4 
Problems emerged following the fall of France to 
Germany. In August 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt received a 
complaint from the Emergency Rescue Committee, an 
organization which coordinated refugee rescue efforts, 
that the American consul in France, operating under new 
instructions (which, incidentally, were in conflict with 
the 2 6 July agreement reached by the PACPR, State 
Department, and the Justice Department), would not grant 
visas to individuals recommended by the PACPR unless they 
had a French exit visa. The problem was that the Vichy 
government, under German pressure, had suspended the 
issuance of exit visas. Mrs. Roosevelt wrote to Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles and his response was 
that the United States did not want to give the 
appearance of helping individuals break French law. He 
assured her, however, that non-French citizens would be 
granted visas even if they were without exit permits.5 Not 
only had Long and the State Department instructed consuls 
to cease issuing visas to refugees without exit permits. 
4Wyman, Paper Walls, 141. 
5Ibid., 142. Long and his lieutenants at the State 
Department disagreed. See Long Diary 23 December 1940 
and, especially, 28 January 1941, for his wish to follow 
the laws. 
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they also restricted the issuance of visas to prominent 
writers and labor leaders, thereby excluding the very 
groups to which the emergency visa policy could best be 
applied.6 Long did not deny this; in fact, Long 
established a series of administrative devices which 
curtailed drastically the flow of refugees into the 
United States.7 
Long's instructions to the consuls to limit the 
issuance of visas (including visas to scholars and 
scientists) nearly caused a mass resignation in the Fall 
of 194 0 by the PACPR.8 When previously the Vichy 
government requested that the United States allow Jewish 
refugees from France to enter the United States, Long 
rejected the request, arguing that "the laws of the 
United States regarding immigration are explicit and do 
not permit any further liberalization . . . ."9 Long 
even abandoned his earlier efforts to rescue Jewish 
rabbis and rabbinical students from the European Yeshivas 
Washington Star. 20 December 1940, clipping in 
container 202, Long Papers. 
7See Long to Berle and Dunn, 26 June 1940, container 
211, Long Papers. 
8New York Evening Post, 11 February 1941, 7. 
9Long to Ray Atherton, 10 December 1940, container 
202, Long Papers. Long also believed that this was just 
an excuse for the Gestapo to plant agents among the 
refugees who would be admitted under a "liberalization" 
of the policy; see Long Diary, 28 January 1941. 
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because he did not believe that there could be any 
"definite assurance" that those whose names were on the 
consular lists would be the same individuals who received 
visas.10 
The case of the S. S. Ouanza perhaps best 
illustrates the belief by PACPR members that Long was the 
major problem. The S. S. Ouanza had sailed from Portugal 
in August 1940 with a large number of refugees on board. 
The intent was to discharge the refugees somewhere in 
either South or North America (at a considerable profit 
to the owners of the ship). Finding that neither 
Nicaragua nor Mexico would accept the passengers, the 
ship's captain sailed northward, preparing to refuel at 
Norfolk, Virginia and then to return to Portugal. Long 
was of the opinion that the captain had "conveniently 
discovered they would have to put into Norfolk for coal" 
and complained about being "flooded with pressure groups 
and telegrams and telephones and personal visits to 
permit the landing of persons off the boat." He noted in 
his diary, however, that he "consistently declined to 
deviate from the procedure which we adopted and said that 
the fact that the people were on the boat and nearing the 
10Long to Warren, 2 June 1941, container 211, Long 
Papers; Long to Travers, 16 December 1943, container 212, 
Long Papers; see also copy of Rabbi S. Gourary to Sidney 
Hillman, 23 June 1941, container 211, Long Papers; Long 
to Warren, 7 February 1941, container 211, Long Papers. 
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American shores did not constitute an emergency of any- 
kind. " He also speculated the only reason some 
considered it to be an emergency was because "they were 
all Jewish" and "they all had money."11 
It was a complex and not too pretty situation. 
Latin American countries had sold visas (at anywhere from 
$100 to $500 each) with the stipulation that the refugee 
could not go to the country which issued the visa. In 
his discussion with Roosevelt, Long assumed that the 
President "would leave the matter entirely in my hands." 
After consultation with the Justice Department and 
recognizing the recommendations of the PACPR and the 
Marshall Field Committee for the Saving of British 
Children regarding the children aboard the S. S. Ouanza, 
Long was willing to allow those persons with valid 
documents to have transit across or through the United 
States "provided they complied with the requirements." 
Long had initially opposed the Justice Department's legal 
reasoning that the ship could dock and the passengers on 
the ship could be screened as to whether or not they 
qualified for visas.12 Henry Feingold argues that Long 
saw this procedure as not only "an attempt to circumvent 
the regulations" but also as a "direct challenge to his 
11Long Diary, 18 September 1940. 
12Ibid. 
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authority, and refused to accept their [sic] legal 
reasoning. "13 
Long was furious when he learned that 4 0 of the 83 
refugees qualified for visas. He insisted that this was 
far in excess of the number I anticipated and I 
am sure now was a very generous interpretation 
of the validity of the documents in question; 
and that [Patrick Malin] had construed 
everybody else on the boat to be a political 
refugee and that they could come ashore.14 
He believed that he had been tricked. Nine days before, 
he had entered in his diary that allowing the refugees to 
land "would be a violation of the spirit of the law if 
not the letter. We have been generous--but there are 
limitations.[italics added]"15 Now he argued that it 
would be a "violation of the Law" and that he "would not 
be a party to it . . . would have no responsibility for 
it" and that he might have to "take up the matter in some 
other way . "16 
13Feingold, The Politics of Rescue. 143-144. 
14Long Diary, 18 September 1940, Long Papers, 
Container 5. 
15Long Diary, 9 September 1940. 
16Long Diary, 18 September 1940. Two days before 
Long had noted that only two adults and maybe their 
children were legally entitled to enter the United 
States. See Memorandum of Conversation, Mr. Patrick 
Malin and Mr. Long, 16 September 1940, container 211, 
Long Papers. 
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The other way he had in mind was to contact the 
President. It was urgent for Long to see the President as 
soon as possible because by late September 1940 several 
refugee rescue organizations had grown impatient with the 
lack of progress in the emergency visa program. The 
PACPR, distraught over what they now concluded was the 
obstructionism of Long and the State Department, was 
already preparing to call for a meeting with the 
President.17 Long was determined to 
place in our Consuls abroad rather than the 
President's Committee in New York the final 
determination as to whether a person was 
entitled to entry into the United States.18 
He was one step away from control of the refugee problem, 
he believed. The "list of the Rabbis has been closed and 
the list of the labor leaders has been closed," he wrote. 
He then concluded that "it remains for the President's 
Committee to be curbed in its activities. . . ."19 
While James McDonald, chairman of the PACPR, 
attempted to undermine Long's influence by working 
through Eleanor Roosevelt, Long gained the upper hand. 
Through his friend, Edwin M."Pa" Watson, Roosevelt's 
17Long Diary, 3 October 1940; clipping from the 
Washington Star. 20 December 1940, container 202, Long 
Papers. 
18Long Diary, 18 September 1940. 
19Ibid. 
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secretary. Long and his representatives at the State 
Department had relatively easy access to the White House 
while McDonald, Myron C. Taylor, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, 
and other refugee advocates were forced to depend on the 
good offices of Mrs. Roosevelt to gain an audience with 
the President. Even at that, the PACPR and other 
refugees advocates soon discovered that when they finally 
got to see the President, either Long or one of his 
associates at the State Department had "briefed" the 
President on the impending meeting. Until 1944 the 
President thus viewed refugee problems through the eyes 
of Long and his associates at the State Department.20 
The Assistant Secretary got his meeting with the 
President and informed Roosevelt that 2,583 special visas 
had already been authorized and urged that enough time 
had passed for the submission of names of most of the 
outstanding political and intellectual refugees, except 
for those in immediate danger.21 Long made it clear that 
he wanted to cancel the department's mandatory 
instructions (from the 2 6 July agreement) which he 
believed gave the PACPR too much authority. He wanted 
20Ibid. See also Washington Star, 20 December 1940, 
clipping in container 202, Long Papers. See also 
Feingold, Politics of Rescue. 145. 
21Ibid. See New York Evening Post, 17 February 1941, 
7 for Long's comments. 
39 
the consuls to have "some latitude of judgment."22 Since 
only 40 of the 567 refugees recommended by the PACPR and 
approved by the State Department had received visas, it 
is obvious that some consuls were already exercising 
"some latitude of judgment." Indeed, the numbers prove 
that refugees were not granted visas from American 
officials in Lisbon as often as suggested.23 This should 
not be surprising, given the fact of George Messersmith's 
warning to Long of the "inflexibility and lack of 
understanding" of Consul Young in Lisbon. Young had, 
among other things, refused to issue replacement visas to 
applicants whose visas had expired because they had not 
been able to reach the American Embassy in Lisbon in 
time.24 
Long had included in an advisory letter to the 
President a draft of a letter from Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull to the PACPR which recommended a more 
careful examination by the consuls in Europe of emergency 
visas with an emphasis upon making the refugees present 
evidence that their past political activities, if 
continued, would not in any way endanger or embarrass the 
22Long to FDR, 18 September 1940, Container 211, Long 
Papers; Long Diary, 18 September 1940. 
23Wyman, Paper Walls, 145. 
24Messersmith to Long, 30 July 1940, container 211, 
Long Papers. 
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United States. This became the official policy on 19 
September 1940.25 
This letter to the President, and the subsequent 
modification of policy, caused an almost complete break 
between the Visa Division of the State Department and the 
PACPR. Hull had become convinced of the correctness of 
Long's position after Long had communicated to him that 
his Visa Division chief, Elliot Coulter, had noted that 
hundreds and perhaps thousands of names had been added to 
the original list given by the PACPR, the A. F. of L., 
and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and other rabbis.26 
As Chairman of the PACPR, McDonald was sincerely 
devoted to the refugee effort and as such was outraged by 
the virtual termination of the special program for 
political refugees. Unaware that Long had already 
contacted the President, McDonald and Warren wanted a 
return to the 2 6 July agreement and hoped that the 
President would intervene on the behalf of the PACPR. 
They contacted Hull, and Eleanor Roosevelt, pleading 
their case. 
25Long to FDR, 18 September 1940, including a draft 
of a letter from Hull to James G. McDonald, container 
211, Long Papers; Long Diary, 24 September 1940. 
26Long Diary, 24 September 1940 and 9 October 1940; 
see also Long Diary, 3 October 1940. Long to Coulter, 14 
September 1940 and Coulter to Long, 17 September 1940, 
container 211, Long Papers. 
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Long had little difficulty in convincing the 
President that the consul on the scene should have the 
final say. Roosevelt had been contacted on several 
occasions by Herbert Pell, American Minister to Lisbon, 
and Pell had prepared the way in the President's mind for 
the "trump card" that Long said he played in the meeting. 
He informed the President that two World Jewish Congress 
officials, sponsored by Stephen S. Wise, were good 
examples of the problems that could occur. The two 
officials, he told the President, and later recorded in 
his diary, 
were a man and his wife who had represented the 
Rabbi's organization but who professed to a 
long series of political activities in Europe 
and an intention to follow a course in the 
United States irrespective of the desires of 
the American Government but to take orders from 
the World Jewish Congress. They professed to 
have been responsible for the overthrow of one 
Rumanian government and to have been very 
active in politics in Europe for years.27 
Long also forwarded to the President a telegram he 
received after their meeting. The telegram was from 
Lawrence A. Steinhardt, Ambassador in Moscow, and it 
warned that any relaxation of policies concerning visas 
could be extremely dangerous. Steinhardt informed Long 
that the consular section in Moscow had suspended all 
doubtful cases because of the "past and future 
27Long Diary, 3 October 1940, container 5. 
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activities" of the applicants, many of whom had been 
"politically active" in such groups as the Zionist Labor 
Party and "might well transplant their entire political 
organization to the United States." Long believed that 
he had won his case, writing that the President "was 100% 
in accord with my ideas," and that Roosevelt was "in 
entire accord with the policy which would exclude persons 
about whom there was any suspicion that they would be 
inimical to the welfare of the United States no matter 
who vouchsafed for them and irrespective of their 
financial or other standing."28 
The fact that Long cited and agreed with Steinhardt, 
and the fact that Roosevelt, knowing both men's basic 
philosophy, did not challenge their recommendations is 
telling. Himself a Jew, Steinhardt expressed to Long in 
1941 a sentiment about Russian, Polish, and Eastern 
European Jews that at first glance appears anti-Semitic. 
He described those immigrants, according to Long, "as 
entirely unfit to become citizens of this country." He 
believed them to be. Long continued, "lawless, scheming, 
defiant--and in many ways unassibilable [sic]." They 
were, in Long's words, "the same as the criminal Jews who 
28Copy of telegram from Steinhardt to Long, 3 October 
1940, container 211, Long Papers. Long Diary, 3 October 
1940. See Congressional Record, LXXXVII. Part 5, 77th 
Congress, 1st Session, 4754-4755. 
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crowd our police dockets in New York and with whom he is 
acquainted and whom he feels are never to become 
moderately decent American citizens." Long was in total 
agreement with Steinhardt's 1941 opinion, writing 
I think he is right--not as regards the Russian 
and Polish Jew alone but the lower level of all 
that Slav population of Eastern Europe and 
Western Asia--the Caucasus, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Croat, Slovene, Carpatho-Ukraine, Montenegro, 
etc. They ... in short have a philosophy 
entirely foreign to our standards of government 
and proper conduct in public and private 
life.29 
Steinhardt's ideas and activities, unlike Long's, changed 
during the war years and he would later become an 
advocate of a much less restrictive refugee policy.30 
When the PACPR got its meeting with Roosevelt six 
days after Long had met him, the issue was apparently 
already settled. Accompanying George Warren, the 
executive secretary of the PACPR, and McDonald, its 
chairman, at the meeting was Francis Biddle, Solicitor 
General, and Henry Hart, Jr., Riddle's assistant. Hart 
noted that McDonald ended the thirty minute session 
completely frustrated because every time he attempted to 
29Long Diary, 28 November 1941. 
30See Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 217 n., for 
a discussion of Steinhardt's activities while he was an 
ambassador to Turkey in 1944. 
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plead his case Roosevelt would remember another anecdote 
to tell.31 
When Long, Hull, and Sumner Welles met with the 
President on the following day, Long recorded in his 
diary that Roosevelt told the group that "he hadn't had 
time to listen to McDonald" and that when Mcdonald 
complained about Long and the new State Department 
policy, he had told McDonald not to "'pull any of that 
sob stuff'"because he "knew enough about the situation to 
know that the Consuls . . . had to have, and he would 
insist upon their having jurisdiction in these cases . . 
ii 32 
Long got what he wanted. He became the official in 
the State Department with the major responsibility for 
determining which refugees would be admitted and which 
would be denied admission to the United States. 
Roosevelt's handling of the PACPR-State Department- 
Justice Department controversy was consistent with the 
way he approached many problems within his 
administration. He was known for playing the middle 
against the ends, telling his speech writers for example 
to work out the differences between them and never 
understanding why that would be a problem. He simply 
31Wyman, Paper Walls, 147 
32Long Diary, 10 October 1940. 
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told the State Department, the Justice Department, and 
the PACPR to work out their differences.33 
McDonald, who was not accustomed as were the members 
of the Roosevelt administration to Roosevelt's manner of 
handling controversy, reported to Felix Frankfurter that 
he believed that he had the support of the President. 
When some members of the PACPR met for dinner five days 
after their visit with the President, they believed that 
they could expect fairness but little initiative from 
Sumner Welles but they expected little cooperation from 
Long.34 
Three days later, on 18 October 1940, Long, Welles, 
and Solicitor General Francis Biddle met and worked out 
the policy that they would follow. They agreed on the 
following: the PACPR should have primary responsibility 
for securing the departure of sponsored refugees from 
Europe; visas could be issued without an exit permit; 
visas should not be based upon either numbers or quota 
but solely upon the "meritorious" qualification of the 
applicants and thus all visa application should be made 
by individuals rather than groups; and, significantly, 
consuls should have the final say in determining who 
"ibid. 
34Breitmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy and 
European Jewry, 133. 
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received the visa. As a concession to the PACPR, 
however, the three men agreed that should a consul reject 
a PACPR-recommended applicant the consul would have to 
cable his reasons to the State Department and follow that 
with a mail dispatch containing the pertinent 
information.35 
The visa situation appeared to be dismal for 
political refugees. By mid-November the Emergency Rescue 
Committee informed Eleanor Roosevelt that almost no new 
visas had been granted under the month-old program. The 
consul in Lisbon was apparently one of the main villains 
in this piece, since there were reports that Washington 
approved refugees had been either refused their visas or 
were still waiting after two months for an approval by 
the consul in Lisbon.35 
Finally, in late November 1940, a compromise was 
worked out. The PACPR would still be permitted to submit 
a list of approved names (provided that the PACPR could 
vouch for the applicant's background and they could show 
that the sponsors could assure the ability of the refugee 
to move to the United States and then to another 
35Long's Memorandum of a Conference at Luncheon, 18 
May 1940, container 211, Long Papers. 
36See Messersmith to Long, 30 July 1940, container 
211, Long Papers, for the previous problems with Lisbon. 
See Wvman.Paper Walls, 147, for the complaints in 
November. 
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country). The names then would be scrutinized by a 
committee consisting of representatives of the State and 
Justice Departments, the FBI, Military Intelligence, and 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the committee would 
then forward its recommendation to the State Department 
and the Justice Department. Only then would the State 
and Justice Departments send their list of approved names 
to the proper consuls in Europe. Consuls still had the 
right to refuse a visa to a person whose name appeared on 
the approved list. Accordingly, after a consul refused a 
visa of an already approved refugee, the process would 
begin all over. In essence, consuls still made the final 
judgment as to the issuance of all visas.37 Long was 
pleased with the outcome, especially since he had fought 
for the inclusion of an FBI agent on the screening 
committee.38 
Long's newly formed interdepartmental committee 
managed to curtail the number of visas which were issued. 
In the period between 5 August and 18 December 1940, only 
21 percent of the applicants for visa were successful.39 
37Long Diary, 14 and 22 November 1940; see also 
Department of State Bulletin, III (21 December 1940) : 
565 . 
38Long Diary, 22 November 1940. 
39The actual number was 238 approved of 1137 
submitted. Feingold, Politics of Rescue, 148. 
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Although this restrictive approach did not please refugee 
advocates in the Justice and Interior Departments, 
several issues would emerge which would increase tensions 
to the breaking point between the supporters of Long's 
policy in the State Department and the advocates in other 
departments in the Roosevelt administration of a more 
lenient refugee and emergency visa policy. The first 
issue regarded the question of national security and its 
relation to the refugee problem. The second issue 
related to the admission of refugee children to the 
United States and could be dated back to Kristallnacht in 
1938, more than a year before Long was appointed 
Assistant Secretary. The third issue, and the one which 
would lead to the eventual establishment of the War 
Refugee Board in 1944, concerned the apparent inability 
of Long and other members of the State Department to 
recognize that Nazi Germany was intent upon achieving the 
final solution to the Jewish problem in Europe. 
Chapter 4 
TO SECURE THE NATION 
Long expressed a concern for saboteurs and possible 
spies which revealed a state of mind that Saul S. 
Friedman has labelled as one of "seeing spies 
everywhere,"1 Long worked against possible spies who 
might infiltrate the United States under the cover of the 
refugee rescue program. He was convinced that members of 
the PACPR were completely ignorant of the possibilities 
of the danger that existed. In one instance he submitted 
to the FBI the name of an individual, approved by the 
PACPR, whom he described in his diary as an "expert 
dynamiter with a subversive intent." He also 
participated in the formation of legislation, submitting 
to Attorney General Francis Biddle a draft text on the 
exclusion of aliens whose entry might prove "inimical to 
the interests of the United States." In addition, he 
'Friedman, No Haven For the Oppressed, 118. 
"Long Diary, 20 November 1940. 
Long to Hull, 1 October 1940, container 5, Long 
Papers. 
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gave his support in late 1940 to the attempt to admit 
some European intellectuals only after the Attorney 
General and the Justice Department agreed to tighten 
immigration procedures.4 
The use of the issue of national security to curtail 
admission of refugees into the United States can be seen 
in the battle between Long and his supporters in the 
State Department and Harold Ickes and his supporters in 
the Interior Department. Ickes and his supporters had 
developed a plan to use the Virgin Islands as a refugee 
way station until the refugees could be admitted into the 
United States. Long and his people opposed such a plan.5 
Although the Interior Department had administrative 
jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands, all matters 
connected to immigration also had to clear the 
bureaucratic and legal tangles of the State Department. 
The planned Interior Department "visitors" policy for 
refugees would not be limited, however, by the quota 
4Memorandum of Long to Hull, 3 and 18 October 1940, 
container 211, Long Papers. 
5There also was an attempt to use Alaska as a 
possible refugee haven; see a bill introduced by Samuel 
Dickstein (Dem., N.Y.) into the House of Representatives 
(House Journal, 2791, 29 January 1941; Congressional 
Record, 88, Part 10, 77th Congress, 1st Session, A41907; 
see also New York Times, 10 December 1940, 30; Long 
Memorandum, 13 November 1940, Container 211, Long Papers; 
and Warren to Hackenworth, 4 February 1941, container 
211, Long Papers. 
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system of the existing immigration laws; the only- 
limitation would be that consuls had the right to 
determine the desirability of prospective "visitors." 
Ickes and his staff attempted to circumvent this 
bureaucratic roadblock by getting a policy adopted that 
would permit a "visitor" to the Virgin Islands without a 
visa and would allow him to remain in the Virgin Islands 
until his name appeared on the list for the permanent 
quota entry to the United States. Long saw this 
approach, if adopted, as a major departure from the 
current immigration policy and he was correct.6 And, as 
was often the case, when a departure from policy 
conflicted with a humanitarian gesture. Long upheld the 
validity of the official policy. 
Ickes and his advisors still had another trump to 
play in their game. An Executive Order in 1938, repeated 
in Executive Order 8430 in June 1940, permitted the 
Governor of the Virgin Islands to open the Islands to 
individuals on an emergency basis without recourse to the 
consuls and without the normal visa process. Proceeding 
on the belief that Long and the State Department would 
acquiesce without seeking Congressional authorization, 
Ickes and Governor Cramer of the Virgin Islands prepared 
6Long Diary, 13 November 1940; Long Memorandum, 13 
November 1940, container 211, Long Papers. 
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to move. Cramer prepared a proclamation that would have 
permitted a select group of refugees to enter the Virgin 
Islands without visas. Long would not support the Cramer 
proposal. First, he was opposed because he saw the Ickes 
proposal as completely ignorant of the possibility of 
infiltration by Nazi spies. "Amongst the twelve 
thousand" refugees in Portugal who would qualify to enter 
under the Ickes plan. Long wrote in his diary, "are many 
German agents." He continued that the proclamation 
"constituted", furthermore, "a pipe line to siphon 
refugees out of Portugal into the United States without 
the precautionary steps of investigation and 
checking...." Long also believed that this was part of a 
collusion between the Interior Department, the PACPR, and 
other refugee advocates. The newspaper clippings of 
comments made by Secretary Ickes that Long kept in his 
files suggest that he believed that Ickes was not only 
unaware of the threat of subversion but was a possible 
threat himself to the security of the United States.7 
7Long Diary, 13 November 1940. Long kept a 
newspaper clipping in which Ickes was quoted as saying 
that he did not see how subversives could get from the 
Virgin Islands to the mainland "unless they're long- 
distanced swimmers." Ickes was further quoted in the same 
clipping as saying "I'd be willing to run the risk of a 
few German agents getting here if a few more lives could 
be saved." See clipping of New York Evening Post, 18 
December 1940, container 202, Long Papers. 
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Long prevailed. The State Department issued a memo 
explaining why the Ickes proposal was not acceptable; and 
President Roosevelt, buttressed by the State Department 
memo and a ruling by Attorney General Robert Jackson to 
the effect that the State Department's position was 
correct, and convinced that the Ickes plan might endanger 
the country, suspended Governor Cramer's proclamation.8 
Not satisfied, Long then attempted to block the use of 
the Virgin Islands as a refugee station of last resort. 
He contacted Admiral Alan J. Kirk, Chief of Naval 
Intelligence, and proposed that the Navy proclaim the 
Virgin Islands "a restricted area for strictly naval 
reasons" and therefore "prevent the raising of the 
political questions involved in this refugee and 
undesirable citizens traffic which is going on...." 
"Then," he concluded in his diary, "we would have no more 
trouble."9 
The scheme to use the Virgin Islands as a refugee 
haven failed because the legal foundation on which it was 
8
"Proposed Proclamation by the Governor of the 
Virgin Islands," under cover letter "Opinion of Legal 
Advisor, Department of State, 16 December 1940, container 
211, Long Papers; Long Diary, 13 November 1940. See also 
a memo by Long included in a copy of a letter by Hull to 
Roosevelt, 25 February 1941, ibid., for Long's fear, 
based on information that he had received from the consul 
in Lisbon, that several of the refugees who wished to get 
in under the PACPR-Ickes plan were known Trotskyites. 
9Long Diary, 22 April 1941. 
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based was not secure. The fact remains, however, that 
the Governor of the Virgin Islands could, through an 
executive order, admit aliens without visas if an 
emergency situation existed. The State Department itself 
had permitted by the end of 1940 political refugees to be 
admitted as "temporary visitors" even though it was 
evident that they could not return to their homeland. 
Long's opposition to the use of the Virgin Islands 
as a refugee way station, and his success in doing so, 
therefore became critical to the development of a refugee 
policy by the United States in the early war years. It 
appears that his national security argument in the case 
of the Virgin Islands provided a foundation for 
subsequent arguments against a liberalization of the 
immigration and visa programs as they pertained to 
refugees from Nazi aggression. If the national security 
argument could work in the case of the Virgin Islands, 
which was more than a thousand miles from the U. S. 
mainland, it could obviously work for the continental 
United States.10 
10Long was selective in cases of national security. 
If a refugee were a Trotskyite or a Zionist, Long opposed 
him. Yet he did not treat others in the same way. See, 
for example, an instance of an anti-Semitic Frenchman, 
Pierre Massin, who, while boasting of his anti-Semitic 
and pro-Fascist activities in France before the war, was 
permitted to enter the United States at a time when Long 
was fighting the admission of refugees to the Virgin 
Islands and the admission of refugee children who were 
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In early 1941, Long renewed his efforts to clamp 
down on the trickle of refugees who entered this 
country.11 His efforts were in response to claims that 
authorities in Germany, Russia, and Poland were coercing 
refugees to engage in espionage activity on threat of 
harm to their families if they did not cooperate. Long 
believed that enough such cases had been discovered to 
warrant a more stringent policy.12 
Almost as if in support of Long's argument, in late 
1941 the House Committee on Un-American Activities heard 
the testimony of Richard Krebs. Krebs was a reformed 
Comintern agent, a veteran of Nazi prisons, and author 
under the pen name of Jean Valtin of Out of the Night. 
He explained, based on his knowledge of Gestapo 
operations, the Nazi methods of espionage in the United 
States. During the hearing Krebs claimed that agents 
disguised as political refugees formed a large group of 
waiting rescue in Portugal. Massin was quoted as saying 
that he "would devote the rest of his life to destroying 
the Jews" by the New York Evening Post. Mr. Massin, it 
seems, could come because he had met all the bureaucratic 
qualifications; he had a proper exit permit from the 
Germans in France and he indicated that he would return 
to France. New York Evening Post. 15 December 1940, 
clipping in container 202, Long Papers. 
11Long to Welles, 17 March 1941, container 211, Long 
Papers. 
12Memorandum of Conversation with Clarence Pickett, 
18 May 1941, container 212, Long Papers; Long to Pickett, 
28 May 1941, ibid. 
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the people chosen by the Nazis to spy for them. He 
further explained that many spies were actually former 
political prisoners of Germany and that the Nazis held 
their families as hostages in order to force them into 
espionage activity. In order to prevent any harm 
befalling a relative held hostage, these agents had to 
forward monthly reports to the Gestapo. Krebs asserted 
that such refugees were easily accepted in democratic 
nations because of their staunch past opposition to 
Nazism, but he insisted that he knew of no case where a 
prisoner was released by the Nazis unless he signed a 
pledge to serve the Gestapo.13 
Kreb's testimony only strengthened Long's desire to 
channel all visa applications through Washington.14 By 
July 1941 his efforts were rewarded and became the 
official policy of the United States. Reacting to 
Ambassador Steinhardt's reports of attempted infiltration 
of the country by foreign agents, Long in early May had 
gone before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations to 
plead his case. The new program he proposed called for 
13,1
 Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities 
in the United States," New York Times, 27 May 1941, 11. 
See also, Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un- 
American Activities, House of Representatives, 77th 
Congress, 1st Session, 26 May, 1941, XIV, 8481, 8488- 
8490 . 
14Long Diary, 25 April 1941; Long to Welles, 17 March 
1941, container 211, Long Papers. 
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an expanded Visa Division, with a staff of 300 persons, 
to carry out the initial processing of immigration 
applications based upon information received from each 
alien's sponsor in the United States concerning the 
applicant's character, purposes for emigrating, attitude 
toward the United States, and the validity of his 
assurance of support. The sponsors, too, would be 
investigated to determine whether or not they were good 
citizens or perhaps "engaged in activities inimical to 
the Government." Another significant addition to the new 
arrangement was the establishment of five 
interdepartmental review boards to pass on the merits of 
each visa application in Washington, thus taking much of 
the decision making away from the consuls in Europe. The 
consuls, however, while relying upon the new system for 
information, would continue to have the final say in visa 
matters. The interdepartmental committees were to 
include representatives from the visa division, the FBI, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence 
Division of the War Department.15 
15Long Diary, 17 June 1941; Steinhardt to Long, 8 May 
1941, container 203, Long Papers; "Additional Urgent 
Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1941," 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations. House of Representatives 77th Congress, 
1st Session, 1 May 1941, II, 137-146; Graham H. Stuart, 
"Wartime Visa Control Procedure," Department of State 
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The compromise which had been reached in November 
1940 to screen political refugees under the emergency 
visa program paved the way for the new procedures 
designed to apply to all immigration.16 Long maintained 
the notion that a time-consuming process would discourage 
"the insidious infiltration of whispering agents...the 
agents of trouble and discord... the saboteurs [who] throw 
monkey wrenches into the machinery...; with the object of 
creating discord and dismay and of rendering nugatory 
efficient organization."17 
Even before Long's system had the force of law 
behind it, the Department had ceased issuing visas to a 
large category of refugees.18 In early June, consular 
and diplomatic officials received instructions to 
withhold visas from applicants who had parents, children, 
brothers or sisters residing in territory held by the 
Germans, Italians, or Russians.19 The State Department 
Bulletin, 11 (10 September 1944): 273. 
16Breckinridge Long, "Memorandum of a Conference at 
Luncheon," 18 October 1940, container 211, Long Papers; 
Department of State Bulletin 3(21 December 1940): 565. 
"Department of State Bulletin, 4(28 June 1941): 761- 
764 . 
18See a report from Long to Hull, 6 January 1941, 
under cover letter "Hull to Roosevelt, 6 January 1941," 
container 211, Long Papers. 
19Department of State Bulletin. 4(21 June 1941): 748. 
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did not go public with the new policy until the report 
was accidentally leaked to the press. State Department 
officials, reported the New York Times. believed the 
policy absolutely necessary because of extensive evidence 
that Germany coerced refugees into becoming spies by 
threatening to harm their families if they did not 
cooperate. Officials cited a case of a refugee living in 
Cuba who had left his family in Germany and was reported 
to have contact daily with the German embassy in 
Havana.20 Long revealed in his diary, however, that he 
was not satisfied with restricting the law to those with 
relatives: 
It just happens that yesterday morning I 
discussed with [Avra] Warren the question of 
excluding all persons whether they had 
relatives in Germany or not and deny visas to 
any immigrant in Germany, Russia, Italy or any 
of their occupied territories.... I had come 
to the point where I think it should be done, 
and I am going to recommend it.21 
The background and effects of the State Department 
instruction of 5 June 1941 were outlined by the 
Department and presented to the President in a 
memorandum. 
Long informed the President that the Department had 
issued the instruction because of a confidential 
20Long Diary, 17 June 1941, container 5, Long Papers; 
New York Times, 18 January 1941, 1. 
2:iLong Diary, 17 June 1941. 
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memorandum received by J. Edgar Hoover. Long learned 
from Hoover that refugees leaving Vichy France were 
required to submit an extra photograph which was 
forwarded to the Second Bureau, which was the agency for 
French espionage activity. Long assumed that many of 
these refugees were forced to agree to spy for the French 
and Germans. This assumption was soon treated as 
concrete evidence and was used as a reason for 
restricting the flow of immigration. Indeed, it is 
hardly a coincidence that the Bloom-Van Nuys bill, 
introduced by a close friend of Long, Sol Bloom, 
reflected Long's philosophy. The bill, which included 
the provision for five separate levels of review for 
every immigration application, became law on 20 June 
1941.22 
In his memorandum to the President, Long justified 
his position by stating that applications would be 
restricted only after "meticulous inquiry" into the 
background of the refugees, and refugees' applications 
would be declared undesirable if "they had agreed to be 
agents for one of these governments or who might under 
circumstances existing and because of their mental 
"Memorandum, Long to Roosevelt, 20 August 1941, 
under cover letter Long to Edwin M. Watson 2 0 August 
1941, container 202, Long Papers; Long Diary, 16 August 
1941. 
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philosophy serve as agents." The last phrase was never 
defined, but consular officials generally interpreted it 
to mean that there should be a general slowing down of 
the inunigration visa policy.23 
Long and his supporters in the State Department were 
delighted with their success at pushing through the 
"relative rule" (as the Bloom-Van Nuys bill came to be 
known). Three years later, Robert Alexander and Long, in 
reviewing the options they had in 1941, concluded that 
their policy, which they defined as a middle-of-the-road 
policy, allowed the immigration door to remain ajar but 
kept out people potentially dangerous to the nation. 
They believed that Hull had also agreed and cited a 
favorable report to Hull from the Attorney General on 27 
November 1942 as proof of the correctness of their 
approach.24 
The State Department also considered the policy a 
holding action until Congress could act to bar 
"subversive elements" from the United States. It was a 
significantly long holding period, however, because Long 
and the Visa Division operated for more than a year to 
restrict dangerous aliens even though there was no legal 
"Ibid. 
24Alexander to Long, 2 February 1944, container 202, 
Long Papers. 
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basis in the immigration laws of that time for the action 
that they were taking. Long was aware of the shaky legal 
claim upon which he and the State Department based the 
new policy and worked steadily to get Congress to provide 
explicit legislative authority for his policy.25 During 
this same time Long got at least part of what he wanted. 
Congress passed laws which gave unequivocal legal 
foundation to his June 5th instruction to the consulates 
and to all diplomatic officials and to his new system, 
which was to go into effect on July 1st. One law gave 
consuls the right to deny visas to anyone they believed 
might "endanger the public safety of the United 
States."26 Although the State Department could review a 
case, the consuls had the final say. The effect of the 
passage of this law was to return the State Department to 
almost complete jurisdiction over the issuance of visas. 
This in effect ended the dependence of the State 
Department on the PACPR and the screening committee 
authorized by the President. 
25See Long to Berle and James C. Dunn, 26 June 1940, 
container 211, Long Papers; Long Diary, 25 April 1941; 
and "Authorizing the Refusal of Visas to Undesirable 
Aliens," Senate Report, 77th Congress, 1st Session, No. 
386 (5 June 1941); Congressional Report. LXXXVII. Part 5, 
77th Congress, 1st Session, 4757, 5048, 5133, 5386. 
26Ibid. 
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Long had been anxious for some time to remove the 
PACPR from any real business of advising in relation to 
the issuance of visas. When he failed to include the 
PACPR in requests for funds for 1941, Long claimed that 
his failure was an oversight and unintentional. Few in 
the PACPR believed him, and only James McDonald's 
recognition that the PACPR was in danger of having no 
funds for 1941 and his subsequent appeal to the First 
Lady saved the PACPR from near extinction. Long, who had 
been known to use appropriation oversight in the past to 
undermine an agency he did not approve, apologized for 
the oversight and corrected his "error."27 
Long was undoubtedly pleased because he interpreted 
the legislation as providing that no alien would be 
permitted to enter the United States "if it appears to 
the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such 
entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United 
States." [italics added]28 It meant that his hand would 
be strengthened considerably. Long's desire to centralize 
the visa system in Washington, a proposal he had 
suggested to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations in 
27Long to McDonald, 5 May 1941, container 188, Long 
Papers; also Henry Feingold, The Politics of Rescue. 160. 
28Congressional Record, LXXXVI, Part 5, 77th 
Congress, 1st Session,, 5053, 5325-5326, 5385-5389; 
Department of State Bulletin 5(15 November 1941): 381- 
382 . 
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May, was now fact and all visa applications, even those 
already through most of the approval process, were now 
voided. All applicants now had to refile with new forms 
provided by the Visa Division in Washington. Sponsors 
now had to affirm by signing an oath that the applicants 
were of good moral and political character; only then 
would the application be placed under review by the State 
Department and other agencies of the Government.29 
Long also wanted to eliminate international 
intervention in the visa granting process. He achieved 
this partially by constantly opposing the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGC). The 
result of these restrictive policies was not severe, 
because nearly 85 percent of the visa applications were 
approved. But Long believed that he had accomplished his 
task of defending the national security from possible 
subversion, writing to Roosevelt that in the previous 
year fully 50 percent of those who were rejected were 
refugees who had relatives in the countries he suspected 
of providing possible espionage agents.30 
29Department of State Bulletin, 4(28 June 1941): 
764-765. 
30Long to Roosevelt, 20 August 1941, container 213, 
Long Papers. See also Memorandum of Conversation, 7 
October 1942, B. Long and Minister of Switzerland, 
container 203, ibid. 
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Several important people spoke out against the Long 
and Visa Division administered policy, including Albert 
Einstein, who wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt that the new 
procedure was making "immigration impossible by creating 
a wall of bureaucratic measures alleged to be necessary 
to protect American against subversive, dangerous 
elements."31 The pleas were to no avail. 
Meanwhile, tension increased between the advocates 
of Long's policy in the State Department and the newly 
appointed Attorney General and his supporters in the 
Justice Department. Biddle was inclined to be more 
lenient in the administration of the restrictive refugee 
policies. Long viewed Biddle's appointment with concern, 
writing in his diary before Biddle's appointment was 
confirmed that the State Department and the Justice 
Department would have some problems. "I have," he 
confided to his diary, "nothing but difficulty with 
Biddle and his subordinates."32 Seventeen months later 
Long was still upset and bitterly complained in his diary 
that "Biddle and his subordinates" had "radical and 
31As quoted in Friedman, No Haven, 124. For a 
discussion of the protest launched against the policy, 
see also: the New York Times, 14 July 1941, p. 4; Jewish 
Comment, 23(24 December 1943): 4; and Freda Kirschwey, "A 
Scandal in the State Department," The Nation 153(19 July 
1944): 45. 
32Long Diary, 17 June 1941. 
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peculiar ideas...some of them inadmissible and 
unacceptable. "33 
The conflict between Biddle and Long surfaced almost 
immediately. Biddle informed Long and the State 
Department that the Justice Department would make the 
final decision in appeals cases when the Appeals Board 
could not reach a decision. Long, "in the spirit of 
friendly cooperation," informed the Attorney General that 
he could not agree with his interpretation of the appeals 
process .34 
Meanwhile the new procedure was under attack by the 
liberal press, especially The Nation and The New 
Republic. with the latter periodical aiming its 
criticisms directly at Long. Long felt a need to defend 
himself and what he increasingly identified as his 
policy.35 
Long's six page memorandum to the President, drafted 
with the assistance of Avra Warren, while acknowledging 
33Long Diary, 27 November 1942 . 
34Long to Biddle, 3 July 1941, container 211, Long 
Papers. 
35For criticisms by the "liberal press," see The 
Nation, 153(19 July 1941): 45; New York Evening Post, 18 
December 1940; and The New Republic, 104(28 July 1941): 
105-106. For Long's reaction to what he referred to as 
the "radical elements and organizations interested in 
getting persons into the United States from doubtful 
territory," [italics added], see Long Diary, 16 August 
1941. 
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as a "natural and wholesome development the PACPR 
opposition to the 'close relatives' policy," played the 
theme of espionage with a heavy hand. The memorandum 
claimed that "foreign agents posing as refugees" had 
either been discovered in the United States or had been 
"apprehended after they left Europe but before they 
reached the United States." Although Long's memorandum 
suggested that Roosevelt should meet with the PACPR to 
clarify the issue, he left no room for chance to 
interfere with his application of visa policy. He 
opportuned "Pa" Watson to arrange a meeting with the 
President before Roosevelt's meeting with McDonald of the 
PACPR. Long left the meeting with the President 
convinced that Roosevelt was "thoroughly in accord with 
our policies and practices."36 
When Long, Attorney General Biddle, McDonald and 
other PACPR representatives met with Roosevelt a week 
later, the PACPR group emphasized that they too were 
concerned about national security but believed the four 
changes that they were recommending in the visa policy 
would not compromise the security of the nation. The 
four changes they recommended were: 1) serious 
36Long to Roosevelt, 2 0 August 1941, under cover 
letter. Long to Edwin M. Watson, 20 August 1941, 
container 202, Long Papers; see also Long Diary, 27 
August 1941. 
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modification of the "relative rule"; 2) the inclusion of 
only the State Department and Justice Department on the 
interdepartmental committees on refugee matters; 3) the 
immediate creation of a board of appeals to hear cases 
unfavorably reported by the interdepartmental committee; 
and 4) the right of refugee sponsors to appear before the 
board of appeals as interested parties. McDonald and the 
PACPR argued that, under the existing policy, not even 
one half of the regular German quota of applicants were 
being accepted each month and that this was, in effect, 
an example of the State Department's barring refugees by 
administrative fiat. Roosevelt appeared to concur with 
the modifications suggested by Attorney General Biddle 
and the PACPR. 
Long was not pleased. He did not hide his contempt 
for Biddle, McDonald, Rabbi Wise, and the PACPR 
supporters when on the same day he recorded his reactions 
in his diary. Indeed, he did not do much to hide his 
feelings in the meeting. He wrote "I got a little mad 
and I fear that I betrayed it...." Wise, he wrote in his 
diary, 
always assumes such a sanctimonious air and 
pleads for the "intellectuals and brave 
spirits, refugees from the torture of 
dictators" or words to that effect. 
Long could not accept the Rabbi's argument. He believed 
that 
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only an infinitesimal fraction of the 
immigrants are of that category--and some are 
certainly German agents and others are 
sympathizers, the last named coming here 
because it is away from the scene of combat and 
looks like a safe place. 
Biddle, Long added, was their "advocate" and he and 
"these eminent gentlemen" saw "my system of selection" as 
completely objectionable. They were after him. Long was 
convinced. 
They would throw me to the wolves in their 
eagerness to destroy me--and will try in the 
future as they have in the past to ruin my 
political status.37 
Long's open opposition had its effect. Roosevelt did not 
cancel the "close relative" policy and he only modified 
the appeals process. What was more important, Biddle, 
finding Long unyielding about his "system of selection," 
offered a compromise in November that saved face for 
Biddle and kept the "system" intact for Long. The 
President would appoint two outsiders (i.e., outside the 
Justice and State Departments) to be added to the review 
board. The Secretary of State, however, coula in 
exceptional cases reverse the decisions of the review 
board. "Thanksgiving Day," Long wrote, "came at an 
appropriate time as far as I am concerned."38 The 
37Long Diary, 4 September 1941. 
38Long Diary, 5 November and 27 November 1941. 
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courses may have been rearranged, but the meal was the 
same. 
The new system went into effect on 1 December 1941 
and included Review Committees and a Board of Appeals. 
Officials on the Review Committees were from the same 
five agencies which were represented on the original 
interdepartmental committees. The interdepartmental 
committees were now titled Primary Committees. Two 
individuals appointed by the President sat on the Board 
of Appeals. 
Under this new visa application process, 
applications first went to the Primary Committee and if 
approved went to the State Department and if approved at 
that level then proceeded to the consul. If an applicant 
were rejected at any point in the process, or if an 
individual on the Primary Committee requested a review of 
an approved application, the case was then sent to the 
Review Committee. At that point the applicant could have 
either or both his legal representative and his sponsor 
plead his case. If rejected either by the Review 
Committee or by the State Department, the applicant still 
had the right of an appeal to the Board of Appeals which 
reviewed the written records but held no hearing. Should 
either the Board of Appeals be divided or the State 
Department opposed, the application for visa would be 
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denied. Only the decision was announced; the reasons for 
rejection were not given. If an applicant decided to 
persist, a reconsideration by the Board could be made 
after a six months delay. Even at that point, a 
successful applicant could be rejected by the consul and 
the whole process would be repeated. No wonder that 
refugee advocates referred to this as the "endless 
appeals system." While the Board of Appeals tended to be 
more sympathetic to the plight of refugees than the 
Review Board, the fact remains that 75 percent of the 
appeals were rejected by the Board.39 
Only 3000 quota visas were issued between 1 July and 
1 December 1941, according to Visa Division Chief, Avra 
Warren. Of those, a large portion actually received 
their visas before the system was centralized in 
Washington, D.C.. A shortage of shipping plus the fact 
"Department of State Bulletin, 5(20 December 1941): 
566; BWF to Long, 3 June 1941, container 212, Long 
Papers. For an interesting survey of the visa 
application process, see Graham H. Stuart, "Wartime Visa- 
Control Procedure," Department of State Bulletin 11(10 
September 1944): 276. See also Wyman, Paper Walls, 202, 
for a sample description of the questions asked sponsors 
by the Review Committees. For example: Are you Jewish 
by race and faith? Do you belong to any political 
organization or group in this country? Have you read 
Tolstoy? Are you still a pacifist? On this last point. 
Long appeared to have a special interest himself, having 
earlier advocated that 92 German-Jewish pacifists, then 
in Britain, be denied admittance to the United States in 
1940 because "if this country is not worth fighting for, 
it is not worth coming to." Long to Coulter, 30 August 
1940, container 211, Long Papers. 
that a visa expired four months after being issued 
explains the delay in their arrival to the United 
States.40 By late August 1941 transportation was no 
longer the problem, thanks to a decline in visa issuance 
the last half of the year.41 
Another lethal regulation had been added in July 
1941 to the visa application procedure. The applicant 
now had to have a form, four feet in length and in six 
copies, filled out by his or her sponsor and forwarded 
not to the consul but to the Visa Division in Washington 
Sponsors now had to prove their reputability by giving 
details about their activities of the past decade, proof 
that the applicant for the visa would not engage in any 
action dangerous to the United States, and character 
references from two or more American citizens whose 
reputability could be easily verified.42 To complicate 
matters, Long specified in order 946 that a particular 
type of typewriter had to be used; one, oddly enough, 
that few consulates in Europe possessed. The AJJDC 
40
"Department of State Appropriations Bill for 1941, 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, 77th Congress, 2nd Session (21 January 
1942), 11, 94. 
41New York Times, 3 September 1941, 18. 
42Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 127 . 
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quickly sent the specified typewriters to the consulates 
in Europe.43 
More obstacles were added in the fall of 1941. 
Applicants were now rejected because they could not prove 
that they were in "acute danger." Refugees who escaped 
Nazi occupied territory and made it to Portugal would not 
be considered in "acute danger" and would therefore be 
denied a visa. Refugees who were unable to flee the 
Nazis, however, were considered to be in acute danger but 
would not be able to receive a visa because there were no 
American consulates in many parts of Nazi occupied 
Europe.44 
The State Department continued to believe that the 
"national security" issue was a viable one even though 
most who have studied the situation believe that the 
"problem as it related to refugees was greatly 
exaggerated. 1,45 Long, in particular, continued to 
believe that refugees were forced to serve as spies 
because they had relatives who were being held hostage by 
the Nazis. His belief was contrary to that of the State 
Department's own Review Board, which argued that an anti- 
Nazi refugee forced to serve as a spy could turn valuable 
"Friedman, No Haven, 123. 
44Conqressional Record, 90, 666. 
4SWyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 130. 
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information over to the Americans and seriously sabotage 
the Nazi spy effort. The Board considered this such a 
possibility that it was convinced that the Nazis would 
never use refugees as spies.46 
The new arrangement by Long might not have become 
policy had not German-American relations deteriorated 
between September 1940 and May 1941. By July 1941 the 
situation had become so tense that the German government 
closed all American consulates, thus making it impossible 
for those who even had valid visas to escape Nazi Germany 
and Nazi occupied Europe. Refugees in Vichy France, 
Spain, and Portugal also faced the fact that those 
governments had restricted severely the issuance of exit 
permits. In August 1941 the German government ceased 
issuing exit permits and in October made it clear that no 
Jews would be allowed to leave either the Reich or the 
Government General of Poland.47 
If Long had not felt the pressure before, he 
certainly did following the events of the summer and fall 
of 1941. He wrote in his diary that "everyone wants their 
[sic] friends out now." He nevertheless adhered to his 
belief that a true security threat still existed, adding 
that "Pressure is very bad and Germany sees her last 
46Ibid. , 131. 
47Tartakower and Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee, 473. 
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chance to get her agents out and our inspection is very 
austere."48 Long, ever the legalist and efficient 
bureaucrat, followed the letter of the law. "No single 
group," he wrote to Sumner Welles, "can be segregated 
from another group and made an exception without 
extending the exception to each member of each other 
group."49 One rule simply bred amplifications for other 
rules. For example, George Messersmith, the Ambassador 
to Cuba, now informed the Cuban government that eighty 
percent of the European born immigrants who had been 
admitted to Cuba would be denied American visas. 
Messersmith then advised the Cuban officials that Cuban 
immigration policy would need to be changed to adjust to 
this new approach.50 
Six months later, the United States was at war. 
Where before national security had been the rationale for 
a strict immigration and visa policy, after 1941 and 
until the end of the war the new rationale used by the 
government was that wartime exigency did not permit 
either the relaxation of policy or the expenditures of 
more monies and energy. Long's argument against a too 
48Long Diary, 25 June 1941. 
49Memorandum, Long to Welles, 1 July 1941, container 
211, Long Papers. 
50Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy and 
European Jewry, 137. 
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liberal refugee policy now took a new twist: by 1943 he 
would write in his diary that too liberal a policy 
concerning Jewish refugees could serve to promote a 
"reaction against their [Jews'] interest" and might 
persuade the public that Hitler's charges were true that 
the United States had gone to war "at the instigation and 
direction of our Jewish citizens."51 
51Long Diary, 20 April 1943 
Chapter 5 
SAVING THE CHILDREN 
Long's interdepartmental committee managed to 
restrict the number of visas which were issued. In the 
period between 5 August and 18 December 1940, only 21 
percent of the applicants for visas were successful.1 
This restrictive approach did not please refugee 
advocates in either the Justice or the Interior 
Departments and an issue emerged which soon increased 
tensions between the supporters of Long in the State 
Department and the advocates of a lenient refugee and 
emergency visa policy. 
The issue concerned the admission of refugee 
children to the United States and could be dated back to 
Kristallnacht in 1938, more than a year before Long was 
appointed Assistant Secretary. Roosevelt had responded 
publicly two weeks after Kristallnacht by announcing that 
he was ordering his ambassador to Germany to return to 
1The actual number was 238 approved of 1137 
submitted. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 148. 
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Washington for a "report and consultation."2 He did not, 
however, break off diplomatic relations with Germany and 
it does not appear as if that course were ever seriously 
considered by the State Department. Roosevelt's major 
response at that time was to mollify the 
restrictionistsin Congress by stating that while the 
State Department was willing to extend visitors' permits 
by six months, such an action should not be construed as 
a modification of the quota system.3 Saul Friedman, in 
No Haven for the Oppressed, and Deborah E. Lipstadt, in 
Beyond Belief, both argue that it was at this point that 
Roosevelt, beset by restrictionists in Congress and at 
his lowest in popular approval, failed to assume a 
potential leadership role in the refugee problem. Robert 
Dallek, in his study of Roosevelt's foreign policy, 
agrees, writing that the "Jewish dilemma did not command 
a very high priority in his mind."4 This failed 
2Samuel Rosenman. ed.. Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt 7 (New York: Macmillan, 1941): 
597. See also New York Times. 15 November 1938, 1; and 
see, for the draft prepared by the State Department, 
Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: 
Macmillan, 1948), 24-25, 599. 
3Rosenman, Public Papers of FDR, 7: 598. See also 
Samuel Dickstein, "Refugees and Economics," Nation 147(10 
December 1938), 609-611; and Freda Kirchwey, "Jews and 
Refugees," Nation 148(20 May 1939): 577-578. 
4Friedman, No Haven, 90-91; Lipstadt, Beyond Belief. 
108; and Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford 
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opportunity, whether deliberate or not, was unfortunate 
because an argument could be made that Roosevelt's 
assumption of a more direct role in the relief and rescue 
programs for refugees, and refugee children in 
particular, would have damaged neither his strained 
relationship with Congress nor his popularity with the 
American public. 
Children were often exempt from anti-refugee 
sentiment and Roosevelt, never one to miss an opportunity 
to enhance his public image, could have acted and gained 
public support with a policy directed toward the rescue 
of innocent children. There were certainly enough 
stories to be exploited: stories of women pleading with 
officials to take their children even though it could 
mean never seeing them again, stories of families 
separated, and stories of children who could not locate 
their parents or any other relatives.5 
Long presented another point of view about refugee 
children. He believed the sympathy expressed for the 
children had taken on the proportions of "an enormous 
psychosis" which could be attributed to "a repressed 
University Press, 1979), 168. 
5Davie, The Refugees Are Now Americans. 17-18; 
Simpson, Refugees. 27; "Admission of German Refugee 
Children," Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization, House of Representatives. 76th 
Congress, 1st Session, (20-22, 24 April 1939), 16, 73. 
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emotion about this war." Long admitted that the matter 
had to be handled "very delicately and carefully," 
because many individuals "who ordinarily are hard-headed, 
common-sensed individuals" had become either "emotional" 
or "temporarily emotional" in the matter of refugee 
children.6 
Long's assessment was mistaken. Many prominent 
individuals, certainly not overly emotional in their 
public dealings, supported the idea of making a special 
case for refugee children. They listened to and agreed 
with the ideas of Clarence Pickett, head of the United 
States Committee for the Care of European Children. So 
encouraging was the support for a special effort that 
rescue advocates believed that Congress should be willing 
to open the door to refugee children regardless of the 
quota system. 
On 9 February 1939, Senator Robert Wagner (Dem., 
N. Y.) and Representative Edith Nourse Rogers (Rep., 
Mass.) introduced a resolution that called for the 
admission over a two year period of 20,000 German 
children under the age of 14.7 Although this was 
6Long Diary, 12 July 1940. 
7See Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
House of Representatives, Hearings of the Joint 
Resolution To Authorize the Admission of a Limited Number 
of Refugee Children, 76th Congress, 1st Session (24-25, 
and 31 May and 1 June 1939; Wagner-Rogers Resolution). 
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encouraging to the rescue advocates, the Wagner-Rogers 
Resolution failed to emerge from the House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization. Rescue advocates were 
discouraged but not deterred. And they were encouraged by 
the fact that public opinion polls revealed that 58 
percent of the Americans who were asked stated that they 
would agree with a policy that would permit the admission 
of French and British children to the United States until 
the war ended, and 2 5 percent of those who responded 
positively said they would be willing to house the 
children themselves.8 
Long, ever the legalist, was disturbed by this type 
of public sentiment. He wrote that the Secretary of 
State had asked him to handle the evacuation of British 
children, but he believed that "under our laws we are 
limited." "The British," he continued, "want to send all 
the children here, and of course that cannot be done. 
They could send them to Canada, and we could take up to 
our quota limit from Canada each month." That was as far 
as he was willing to go, and he was relieved that "the 
enthusiasm is liable to wane at the end of a long 
period . . . . 1,9 
aNew York Times, "Report on a Gallup Poll," 2 0 June 
1940, 1; and also 26 June 1940, 12. 
9Long Diary, 19 June 1940. 
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Meanwhile, Joesph Chamberlain, director of the 
National Refugee Service, James McDonald of the PACPR, 
and Eleanor Roosevelt, honorary director of the newly 
formed U.S.C., pushed for a relaxation of the quota 
system in regard to refugee children. To eliminate the 
opposition based solely on the concern that such children 
would become a public charge, Chamberlain and McDonald 
assured the State Department that they had financial 
guarantees for each refugee child. Mrs. Roosevelt 
indicated that she had more than 15,000 families willing 
to accept refugee children from Britain.10 
Long could envision only the bureaucratic tangle 
that such an approach would create. "Each case," he 
noted in his diary, 
has to be handled individually and places found 
for the children before they are given visas. 
We do not want the Department responsible or 
the Government in it except so far as granting 
of visas exercises a control over the situation 
in compliance with the law. 
This could be a true headache, Long argued. There had to 
be permanent arrangements and the children would "have to 
have permanent immigration visas and the persons with 
whom they placed will have to be responsible." He was 
worried that the rate of about 2000 per month was more 
10Christian Century, 57(3 July 1940): 94; New York 
Times, 21 June 1940 1, 13; ibid., 22 June 1940, 7; ibid., 
23 June 1940, 2; ibid., 4 July 1940, 3; and ibid., 11 
July 1940, 9. 
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than the Department could handle.11 Long foresaw another 
scenario that was even more dangerous. Should an 
American ship be torpedoed with refugee children on 
board, Long argued, American public sentiment might swing 
toward entering the war. It was a thought which appalled 
him. 
The very surest way to get America into this 
war would be to send an American ship to 
England and put 2000 babies on it and then have 
it sunk by a German torpedo. That would shove 
us right in the middle of the war, and that 
cannot be done. 
On top of the threat of war should such a catastrophe 
occur. Long believed that the pressure for visas would 
surely increase. On this point he was adamant. He wrote 
that the State Department had "just tightened our 
immigration restrictions for very good and sufficient 
reasons, and I am not going to recede one inch . . . . 1,12 
Apparently those who were committed to the rescue of 
refugee children would not budge either. A new 
organization, the American Women's Committee for the 
Release of Mercy Ships for Children, agitated for mercy 
"Nothing appeared to be going right for Long at this 
time. "To add to my worries," he added in the same diary 
entry, "the gardener told me last night that he wanted to 
quit ." Long's worries had just begun. Long Diary, 19 
June 1940. 
12Long Diary, 12 July 1940. 
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ships to rescue the children.13 Raymond Clapper used the 
Washington Daily News to issue a call for the White House 
to save the children and to point out that the major 
obstacle was the existing immigration laws and their 
application by the State Department.14 The 
administration's response to Clapper was a press release 
which stated that handing out visas to children was much 
"easier than transporting [them] overseas aboard 
ships."15 Roosevelt would have to surrender, however, to 
the considerable support that was given to a bill 
introduced into the House of Representatives by Thomas C. 
Hennings {Dem., Mo.). The bill would have amended the 
neutrality laws so as to permit the use of American 
unarmed and unescorted mercy ships to evacuate children, 
provided a safe conduct was promised by Germany. 
Although Roosevelt was concerned that the White House 
would have to accept the responsibility for negotiation 
of the passage of the mercy ships and would have 
preferred that the matter be handled by the International 
Red Cross, the bill passed the House and the Senate and 
13New York Times, 17 July, 13; 18 July, 17; 19 July, 
19; 23 July, 15; and 24 July 1940, 12. 
"Clipping, "Let's Save Our Children," Washington 
Daily News, 6 July 1940, container 202, Long Papers. 
""Quoted in Feingold, Politics of Rescue, 153. 
became law on 27 August 1940.16 Long admitted that he 
was not "enthusiastic, to say the least, about the bill," 
but noted too that "there is an enormous public demand 
for saving those children." He believed that he could 
weather the storm and proceeded to attempt to limit the 
bill "so it will not be a perpetual rider on the 
Neutrality Act and operate to bring in French, Poles, 
German refugees etc., etc. to the vitiation of our 
immigration laws."17 Perhaps the change in Long's tone 
from an unwillingness to "recede one inch" to an 
unenthusiastic acceptance was partially because, as David 
Wyman suggested in Paper Walls, most of the refugees 
affected by the Henning sponsored legislation were 
British and few were Jewish.18 
The refugee advocates, however, had not won the 
battle. Germany refused to guarantee safe passage and, 
in fact, sank in late August a Canadian liner, the 
Arandora Star, which was carrying refugees and prisoners 
of war to Canada. Less than a month later another shi^, 
the S.. £>. City of Benares, carrying refugee children and 
16See New York Times, 27 July 1940, 1, 4, 12, and 17 
August 1940, 7. See also Congressional Record, 86, Part 
9, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 10028, ND Part 10, 10471- 
10472 . 
17Long Diary, 13 August 1940. 
18Wyman, Paper Walls ,12 6-127. 
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adults, was also sunk, with a death toll among the 
children of 79.19 Coupled with the hesitance of Long in 
the State Department and a similar approach by some of 
the consuls (most noteworthy the Lisbon Consul) to the 
admission of children other than British children outside 
the immigration quotas, the loss of life in the Benares 
sinking served to discourage the hopes of the rescue 
advocates. 
The State Department often would not grant emergency 
visas even when there was a situation where the national 
quota was not filled. Although there was evidence that 
15,000 Polish children and their mothers were in "extreme 
distress" in Spain and Portugal and the quota was not 
filled for Poland, the State Department did not act.20 
The situation for refugees, particularly Jewish refugees, 
grew even more severe as 1940 drew to a close. By 4 
October 1940 a decree by the Vichy government had 
authorized the internment in France of foreign Jews. 
Many of those interned were forced into labor brigades 
and died of cold, hunger, and disease.21 
19New York Times, 2 September, 1; 23 September, 1; 
and 27 September 1940, 1; see also "The Evacuation of 
Refugee Children Our Responsibility," Social Science 
Review, 14(September 1940): 543. 
20Wyman, Paper Walls, 129. 
21Lucy S. Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 488. 
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Neither the State Department nor any official in the 
United States government could claim ignorance. The 
International Red Cross, for example, reported on the 
conditions at Gurs, a camp in southern France. There, 
the Red Cross Report indicated, 12,000 people were 
attempting to survive on 9,000 rations; and shelter, 
clothing, and the basic necessities were in short supply. 
One relief worker spoke of 800 individuals dying in the 
five months of the previous winter, the removal of the 
children from their parents, and the placement of the 
children in special segregated camps where conditions 
were really no better.22 
Even with growing evidence that a horribj.2 situation 
had developed for the refugees in Europe, Congress would 
not act. When Congressman William T. Schulte proposed a 
bill to permit children under the age of 16 to enter the 
U. S. on a visitors' visa and remain until conditions 
would allow them to return home, he faced a stone wall 
and the bill was never reported out of the House Rules 
Committee.23 
22New York Times. 28 December 1940; see also Wyman, 
Paper Walls, 130. 
"Congressional Record, LXXXVI, Part 9, 7 6th 
Congress, 3rd Session, 20032; and New York Times, 9 
August 1940. 
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The President was besieged by the PACPR and by other 
refugee aid agencies to help but little was done. Rumors 
were widespread that the Vichy government was planning to 
permit the deportation of Jews to Eastern Europe; and the 
State Department, apparently fearful that diplomatic 
relations with France could be broken off, withheld 
criticism. Several relief agencies therefore met with 
both Pierre Laval, the Prime Minister of the Vichy 
government, and Philippe Petain, the Vichy President, in 
order to find some way to mitigate the situation. 
Laval, who thinly disguised his dislike for foreign 
Jews, argued that the Nazi government meant no harm to 
the refugees and that the United States and Britain were 
leaving the refugee burden mainly in the hands of the 
French. Petain offered little that was different. The 
representatives of the refugee rescue organizations then 
contacted the U. S. State Department and discovered that 
the U. S. charge d'affaires to the Vichy government, 
S. Pinckney Tuck, was asking the French authorities to 
suspend both the deportation of three hundred children 
and those refugees with immigration visas.24 
24Donald Lowrie, The Hunted Children, (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1963), 204. New York Times, 5 September 1942, 
3. See also Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy 
and European Jewry, 161-162 
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Tuck was aware that only concrete proposals from 
Washington would provide Laval with the chance to save 
face and curtail international criticism at the same 
time. He therefore wrote to Washington that, considering 
the fact that few of the deported parents were likely to 
"survive the treatment they are now undergoing," 
Washington should contemplate treating the refugee 
children in a special way because "many of these children 
may already be considered orphans." He believed it 
intolerable to leave the children in France25 
Whatever the case. Long remained wary of the 
proposal to admit children. "The appeal for asylum," he 
wrote in his diary, 
is irresistible to any human instinct and the 
act of barbarity just as repulsive as the 
result is appalling. But we cannot receive 
into our own midst ALL -- or even a large 
fraction of the oppressed -- and no other 
country will receive them or even a few 
thousand, except that the President of Santo 
Domingo offers to receive and care for 3,500 
children .... My personal reaction to that 
is that Trujillo was trying to embarrass [Avra] 
Warren.26 
Long could not reconcile himself to take in even the 
agreed upon 5000 of those he had referred to as 
25Quoted in Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee 
Policy and European Jewry, 162. 
26Long Diary, 12 September 1942 
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"derelicts,"27 and wrote that the "President definitely 
declined to receive 15,000 of these Poles.... England 
has much thinly occupied territory in Africa... but they 
want us to take them here...."28 Long had to reconsider 
his approach. Attacks on the State Department, and 
Secretary Hull's suggestion that humanitarianism 
sometimes made for good politics,29 helped persuade Long 
to modify his approach and acquiesce. 
Tragically, it came too late. The Portuguese liner 
.S. S.. Mouzenho left Baltimore on 7 November 1942 with 
doctors, nurses, and child care experts on board and a 
relief fund of $1,000,000 to pay for the initial passage 
of 1000 children. On that same day, Laval cancelled the 
exit visas for children because, according to S. Pinckney 
Tuck, he was upset about the unfavorable press releases 
that had accompanied the departure of the ship. Only 
"bona-fide orphans", according to the new French policy, 
would be allowed to leave and those children whose 
parents had been deported but were not certified as 
deceased did not qualify as "bona-fide orphans." 
Originally, Laval's officials agreed to recognize only 
100 children as "orphans," but Tuck's pleas convinced the 
27Ibid. 
28Long Diary, 26 September 1942. 
29Ibid. , 29 Sept 1942 . 
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Laval government to increase the number to 500. The 
invasion of North Africa by Allied forces made all these 
arrangements moot. To meet the military threat posed by 
the invasion, the Germans moved into southern France just 
one day before the children were scheduled to begin their 
departure. Although negotiations on behalf of the 
children would continue for the next eighteen months, all 
efforts to rescue the "orphans" failed.30 Of the 5,000 
children who might have been saved from possible 
destruction, only 32 reached the United States.Jl 
Those children who were fortunate enough either to 
be smuggled out of France into Spain or to be hidden from 
the Nazis by church officials in France still had a 
chance. The PACPR and relief agencies appealed to and 
convinced Under Secretary Welles to permit refugee 
children in Spain and Portugal to enter the United States 
as part of the originally planned 5000; Welles also 
agreed that, when possible, the children's mothers would 
be permitted also to enter the United States. Long and 
the Visa Division of the Department, however. 
30See Lowrie, The Hunted Children, 223-224; and 
Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 37. 
31
 "Chronicle," Contemporary Jewish Record 5(December 
1942), 634; see also "Minutes of the Meeting of American 
Delegation," 25 April 1943, Bermuda Folder, container 
203, Long Papers. 
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successfully defeated any attempt to include mothers who 
did not meet the prescribed procedures.32 
Originally, the Visa Division planned to allow into 
the United States only those children whose parents had 
been deported. After the Division relented to pressure 
from refugee relief organizations, it still delayed 
dispatching the necessary instructions to American 
consuls; when it finally did so, the instructions arrived 
in Lisbon and almost immediately thereafter 31 children 
sailed for America. Twenty one more children who had 
made it to Portugal also sailed for the U.S. Those 
children who made it to Spain discovered that the 
American consulate was not as cooperative, despite 
appeals by Mrs. Roosevelt to Under Secretary Welles to 
facilitate the departure of the children. In total, 125 
children left Spain and Portugal for the United States in 
1943. A dozen more came to the United States before the 
war ended in Europe. 
The failure to rescue, save for the few already 
mentioned, the 60,000 children in Vichy France is but one 
part of the broader Holocaust nightmare. It indicates, 
however, what could have been done had the United States 
adopted a more lenient and speedy visa program. The role 
32See Long to Welles, 26 October 1942, container 202, 
Long Papers. 
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of the State Department, and particularly Breckinridge 
Long and the Visa Division, was crucial. But they were 
not solely responsible. Indeed, one eye witness to these 
events. Abbe Glasberg, a Catholic priest active in the 
Oeuvre de Secours Aux Enfants. believed that all 60,000 
children could have been saved only if there had been 
more enthusiasm by the proper authorities, more money, 
and a less bureaucratic application of the visa system.33 
Long himself admitted that the transportation of the 
refugees was never a real problem when he wrote to Hull 
in 1943 that the cost was "not so large... perhaps $2,000 
to $5,000 per person per year."34 Long and the State 
Department were also aware that the Danish Ambassador, 
Henrik de Kauffman, had more than $20 million at his 
disposal to aid in the refugee rescue effort. Yet, no 
action was taken by the State Department. 
Long and his friends at the State Department were 
involved in two other offers to rescue refugee children. 
The first concerned a Rumanian offer to transport aboard 
two vessels chartered by the allies 4,500 children from 
Constanza to Palestine. The British agreed to the plan 
with the provision that the children met their 
"Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A 
Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: Random House, 
1968), 70. 
34Long to Hull, 23 March 1943. 
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requirements. The Antonescu regime offered to help in 
getting the children through Rumania. Long explained to 
Congress that the plan collapsed because the "Germans got 
wind of it and stopped it."35 He failed to inform 
Congress that the State Department's vacillation may have 
been as much a factor. The United States was supposed to 
supply $150,000 for the funding of the project [the 
President's Emergency Fund, which was designed for just 
such occasions, had more than $500,000 to use at this 
time], but the State Department misled the British and 
others into believing that the monies had to be 
appropriated by Congress. By the time the matter was 
clarified, the Gestapo had stepped in and stopped the 
pre j ect.36 
The second children's rescue effort involved an 
offer by the Swedish government to negotiate with the 
Germans for the release of 20,000 Jewish children. Under 
the plan, approved by the British Foreign Office in May 
1943, the childien would remain in Sweden for the 
35U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Resolutions 
Providing for the Establishment by the Executive of a 
Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People 
of Europe, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 1943, 30. See 
also Memorandum by R. Borden Reams to Under Secretary 
Stettenius, 8 Oct 1943, container 212, Long Papers. 
"Ambassador Dodd to Hull, 21 April 1943, container 
203, Long Papers. See also Friedman, No Haven. 207. 
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duration of the war while the British and American 
governments would meet the expenses necessary to the 
subsistence of the children. Long, R. Borden Reams 
(Long's principal advisor on Jewish questions in the 
State Department's Division of European Affairs), and 
George Brant (Long's executive assistant) offered 
bureaucratic and "political" reasons why the project 
should be examined closely. Their major reservation was 
that the singling out of Jewish children alone might 
encourage the Nazis to intensify their efforts to 
eliminate the Jews. After six months of delay, the State 
Department accepted in December the proposal which had by 
that time included Norwegian children as well. The 
opportunity, however, had been missed, because neither 
the Swedish nor the Nazi governments seemed interested in 
the project.37 
37Morse, While Six Million Died. 65-67. For insight 
to Long's opinions at this time, see his communications 
with Dr. A London, the Netherlands Ambassador. Dr. 
London had expressed concern that he feared that the 60- 
70,000 Jews who were removed from Holland and shipped to 
Poland would most likely be "liquidated by the German 
officials" upon their arrival in Poland. Welles 
responded to Ambassador London's concern by stating that 
there must be "positive proof to this effect" and added 
that the U. S. Government would be very interested in 
whatever information that the Ambassador could provide. 
Long concurred with Under Secretary Welles and had 
indicated on several occasions that he believed that 
often the atrocity stories were nothing more than 
propaganda in order to concentrate public opinion 
exclusively on the rescue of Jews. Alexander to Long, 14 
May 1943, container 203, Long Papers; Memorandum of 
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Conversation, Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. London, and 
Under Secretary Mr. Welles, 13 August 1943, ibid. 
Chapter 6 
The Bermuda Conference 
The State Department's ineffectiveness in its effort 
to save European Jews can be understood only if one looks 
at the total picture. It appears to reveal a policy 
which avoided rescue efforts. Because of this 
appearance, the State Department and Breckinridge Long 
came under increasing criticism. Perhaps the most 
impressive action taken to appease the critics was the 
Bermuda Conference of April 194 3 
On 20 January 1943 the British delivered a carefully 
worded document to the U. S. State Department proposing 
another "informal U ited Nations conference" to discuss 
the rescue of efugees who had already reached neutral 
European nations. No publicity was to attend the 
conference. The proposal was to help tlose refugees who 
were comparatively safe, which is why the Bermuda 
Conference was later referred to as a "hollow mockery" by 
the rescue advocates. The British also insisted that the 
refugee question should not be treated as solely a Jewish 
question. Following a summary of all Britain had done 
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for refugees, the document closed with an appeal to 
Washington to relax its restrictive visa policy. 
Washington was also asked to support the condition that 
neutral countries would be guaranteed that any refugees 
they accepted during the war would be repatriated at the 
end of the war.1 Assistant Secretary Long was furious. 
He believed that the British were attempting to show to 
other nations that they were more willing than the United 
States to help refugees. He called the British 
presentation mere "words and gestures." Consequently, 
the dispatch sent to the British, and signed by Welles, 
was clearly the effort of Breckinridge Long. The closing 
remarks in the dispatch reveal the resentment of Long and 
Welles; it stated that "It is well known to us that a 
campaign to undermine our foreign policy has been pursued 
by certain elements in the British Government."2 
As chief policy maker concerning European refugees. 
Long had the responsibility to respond with a formal 
reply. He did this one month after the Braiish Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Richard Law, had warned that public 
opinion would force the British to act. The response. 
Memorandum Submitted to Bermuda Refugee Conference 
by the World Jewish Congress, 14 April 1943, reprinted in 
Tartakower and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, 585-86; see 
also Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 190-91. 
2Long Diary, 29 January 1943. 
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signed by Hull, contained many discortions and 
exaggerations in its descriptions of departmental policy 
toward refugees. Of this reply. Long wrote: "Their note 
of January 20 (or thereabouts) was a plain effort to 
embarrass us by dumping the international aspects of that 
question plumb in our lap. I picked up the ball and by 
our Feb. 2 5 reply put the baby uncomfortably back in 
their laps."3 
In his response he wrote that United States 
immigration laws had been applied as liberally as 
possible, a gross exaggeration. He also implied that 
since 1933 the United States had accepted into the 
country 500,000 refugees. In reality only about one half 
that number had actually entered the United States. Long 
also cited as proof of the Department's good will the 
United States internment of prisoners captured by the 
British. Even moi amazing was Long's listing the 
"relocation centers" housing 110,000 persons of the 
Japanese race as Department efforts towards refugees 
(amazing because many of those "refugees" were actually 
citizens of the United States). Nevertheless, Long was 
willing to accept a new conference as long as no new 
3Long's Draft with a letter from Long to Welles, 22 
February 1943, container 212, Long Papers; Department of 
State Bulletin, 8 (6 March 1943) : 202-204; Long Diary, 19 
March 1943. 
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commitments were expected. He did, however, call for the 
revitalization of the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC). 
He would not accede to the argument that Hitler's primary 
target was the Jews.4 
Long's insistence that the IGC should be the 
designated organization to handle the refugee problem is 
indicative of his desire to keep control of the refugee 
policy within the domain of the State Department. 
Organized in 1938, the IGC never had the full support of 
its twenty-nine member nations. It was difficult even to 
convene its Executive Committee. The IGC had done little 
to alleviate the refugee problem; indeed, it was argued 
that it was a part of the problem. Long carefully 
defended the need to continue the IGC even though most 
refugee rescue advocates saw it as an ineffectual agency. 
It was not surprisinc, therefore, that Long opposed 
a new refugee conference based upon the idea of changing 
the existing refugee rescue structure. A new refugee 
rescue conference could have obvious political benefits, 
however, the most noteworthy being the diffusion of 
criticism; but the conference could be accepted only if 
the IGC remained intact. Long, capitalizing on public 
awareness stimulated by an eleven roint refugee rescue 
proposal proclaimed by the World Jewish Congress at a 
"ibid. 
Madison Square Garden lally on 1 March, 1943, preempted 
the British initiative and released a public reply to the 
British endorsing the call for the new conference.5 
Meanwhile Long prepared for his meeting with Anthony 
Eden, head of the British delegation. It was a meeting 
that Long did not want. Long distrusted Eden and 
believed that Eden was still carrying a grudge against 
him for the fact that as Ambassador to Italy Long had 
opposed oil sanctions agains*" Italy during the Ethiopian 
Crisis in 1935.6 He was determined, however, to prevent 
the British from stealing the spotlight and he knew that 
the meeting was important. He persuaded Hull and 
Roosevelt to reject Eden's suggestions that Washington, 
D.C. serve as the site of the conference. He wanted the 
conference to be away from the prying eyes of the press. 
A conference in Washington, D.C., he argued, would expose 
the State Department to "all the pressure which would be 
coming from the locally organized groups in this country 
5New York Times, 4 March 1943, 9; Memorandum 
Submitted to the Bermuda Refugee Conference by the World 
Jewish Congress, 14 April 1943, reprinted in Tartakower 
and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, 586. 
6Long Diary, 16 February 1943. 
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[like the American Jewish Congress]." Bermuda was 
finally the site agreed upon.7 
Eden appeared to be more concerned about quieting 
public opinion in Britain than fighting with an Assistant 
Secretary of the United States State Department. Eden 
wanted the two nations to issue a joint statement in 
favor of some kind of refugee rescue and was prepared to 
announce that Britain was ready to admit 30,000 refugee 
children to Palestine. Hull suggested that Long, Ray 
Atherton, Chief of the State Department's European 
Affairs Division, and William Strange, British Assistant 
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, meet and work out a 
joint statement.8 
Long, however, could not rid his mind of the notion 
that the British were attempting to belittle the refugee 
rescue efforts of both the State Department and himself.9 
Things did not go well. Strange was unimpressed with 
Long's self-proclaimed importance and Long himself, 
perhaps approaching a physical collapse from all the 
7Long Diary, 19 March 1943. Memorandum of a 
telephone conversation, Long and FDR, 19 March 1943, 
container 2 02, Long Papers; Representative Emanuel Celler 
described Bermuda as "hermetically sealed." United States 
Congress, House, Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st 
Session, 1943, pt. 10: A2154. 
8Feingold/ Politics of Rescue, 193. 
9Long Diary, 22 March 1943. 
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pressures that he had sustained in his three years in 
handling the refugee problems, admitted m his diary that 
his "reserves of nervous energies [were] lacking." 10ate. 
The final memorandum was to be sent without 
reference to the IGC, but at Long's insistence a proviso 
was included that noted that future consideration should 
not be precluded. The memorandum sugge^ed that the 
refugees should be divided into two groups; tnose under 
Nazi control and those who had escaped to a neutral 
country. Only the second group would receive 
consideration of aid; for the group most in need of help, 
howe er, "no steps to relieve them other than military 
steps can be taken."11 On 23 March Roosevelt received a 
memo from Hull, wncten by Long, which discussed the 
plans to counteract the "deep sentiments on the part of 
the Jewish elements of our population."12 
10Long Diary, 23 March 1943. John Morton Blum quotes 
Morgenthau as writing that Under Secretary Stettinius on 
16 January 1944 "'was very frank in his views on Long's 
failures'" and agreed with Morgenthau that Long's "only 
remaining function" should be to work as a liason with 
Congress. Quoted in John Morton Blum, From the 
Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, Vol. Ill, 1941-1945 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 221-222. 
Memorandum of Agreement; Atherton, Long, and 
Strange, 22 March 1943, container 203, Long Papers. 
12Copy of Hull to FDR, 23 March 1943, container 203, 
Long Papers. 
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First, although he did not inform Roosevelt that he 
was doing so. Long packed the delegation which was to 
attend the Bermuda Conference witn those who were close 
to his beliefs about refugee matters. Assistant Majority 
Leader in the Senate, Scott Lucas 'Democrat, Illinois) 
and Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York), Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, were tne Congressional members 
in the delegation. Both were friends of Long and were in 
agreement with his attitudes 'oout the refugee problem. 
R. Borden Reams, Secretary to the Executive Committee of 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and a close 
friend of Long, was chosen to serve as the Secretary of 
the U. S. delegation. Robert Alexander, Long's immediate 
assistant, was also a part of the delegation. The only 
member of the delegation who was not a close friend or 
associate of Long was George Warren, Executive Secretary 
of the PACPR. 
Long probably breathed a sigh of relief when Myron 
Taylor, a key player in the Evian Conference and the IGC 
as well, declined to head the delegation. Taylor claimed 
the press of his other duties but he also believed that 
little if anything would come out of the conference. 
Taylor's ideas about the refugee situation were in direct 
opposition to those of Long: he believed that both the 
United States and Britain needed to take in more 
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refugees, that all transportation costs should be borne 
by the government, and that there should be a guarantee 
of refugee evacuation following the war so that other 
countries would also be willing to open their door to 
refugees .13 
Long's old friend and the President of Princeton, 
Harold W. Dodds, accepted the post of the head of the 
American delegation to Bermuda. Meanwhile, Jamuel 
Dickstein, Chairman of the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee, had written to Roosevelt 
requesting that he be included in the American 
delegation. He argued that he was knowledgeable about 
refugee matters and favored by Orthodox Jews in the 
United States.14 Long preferred Bloom, whom he had 
described three years earlier as "easier to handle" and 
"terribly ambitious for publicity."15 
Long would not heed the advice of Rabbi Wise, who 
believed that Dickstein would be a better choice and more 
representative of American Jewry; he wrote in his diary 
13Copy of Taylor to Welles, 3 April 1943, container 
203, Long Papers. 
14Copy of Dickstein to FDR, 2 April 1943, container 
2 02, Long Papers. 
15Long Diary, 20 June 1940. 
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that Bloom was "a representative of America" and that 
appeared to him to be a sufficient enough answer.16 
Just as Long thought all was well the British threw 
him a curve ball. In the midst of trying to convince 
Jewish leaders that the Bermuda Conference was designed 
to address all refugee problems, not specifically Jewish 
ones, Whitehall attempted to get an invitation to the 
conference for the Jewish Board of Deputies, a major 
organization for British Jews. Long was upset. He 
reminded the British that the United States had 
constantly held the position that the refugee rescue 
crisis was general and not exclusively Jewish. He also 
was determined that the "no visitor" rule should remain 
intact, realizing that the United States would be 
embarrassed should the British allow a Jewish 
organization to attend while no American Jewish groups 
were given that privilege.17 
To add to Long's woes, Rabbi Wise complained to the 
State Department that, with thousands of Jews already 
dead, Long's description of the conference as "primarily 
exploratory" was a travesty and weakened the chance of 
1€Long Diary, 3 April 1943. 
17Long to Law, 7 April 1943, container 202, Long 
Papers. 
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anything concrete being accomplished.18 Philip Murray, 
President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
warned the State Department that the conference could be 
as futile as the Evian Conference and would instill 
little confidence in the allied rescue efforts if it were 
conducted in secrecy.19 
The State Department publicly denied the charges of 
Murray one week later.20 Meanwhile, Long advised the 
delegates to the conference to ignore the communications 
of refugee advocates, whose demands he termed as 
"unrealistic" and not permitted under the IGC mandate.21 
Privately, Long scribed the activities of Rabbi Wise 
and the World Jewish Congress as "so assiduous in pushing 
their particular cause...that they are apt to produce a 
reaction against their interest."22 He also worried 
that Germany might use the protests. Senate Resolutions, 
and "broadsides bearing the names of high Government 
"Memorandum Submitted to the Bermuda Refugee 
Conference by the World Jewish Congress. 14 April 1943, 
reprinted in Tartakower and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, 
587 
19Copy of Murray to Welles, 19 April 1943, container 
2 02, Long Papers. 
20Department of State Bulletin, 8(26 April 1943) : 
386. 
21Memorandum to American Delegation, 17 April 1943, 
container 2 03, Long Papers. 
22Long Diary, 20 April 1943. 
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officials" as propaganda to support their contention that 
the Jews in the United States were the reason why the 
United States was fighting the war. He concluded that 
neutral nations, such as Spain, and many of the Moslem 
nations "will be easy believers in such charges. It 
might easily be a definite detriment to our war 
efforts. 1123 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle divided the 
proposals of the rescue advocates into three major 
categories: (1) those that called for a retaliatory 
response, such as an attack upon a German city every time 
an atrocity against refugees was confirmed; (2) those 
that argued that the United Nations should issue another 
warning that there would be war crime trials following 
the war for massacres committed during the war; and (3) 
those that promoted the idea of rescuing through Spain 
and the Balkans those Jews who had survived the Germans. 
In regard to the first proposal, Berle contacted Air 
Force officials and they informed him that all the 
available air power was needed to achieve military 
objectives. That apparently ruled out for Berle the use 
of reprisal air raids. He also argued that such 
reprisals would put the United States "on a moral plane 
with the Germans, which I think we should not wish to 
"Ibid. 
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do." Berle also did not believe in the feasibility of 
the rescue of refugees through the Balkans and Spain, 
although he was willing to give moral but not financial 
support to a scheme to temporarily settle 100,000 
refugees in Libya for the duration of the war. The 
remaining option, a United Nations denunciation of 
genocide which would hold all Germans accountable for 
atrocities committed, seemed in Berle's opinion to have 
the best chance of success in halting the atrocities.24 
Long disagreed with Berle's belief that a United 
Nations declaration would cause a public response in 
Germany and force the German government to discontinue 
its activities. He told Hull that he believed that such 
a declaration would unite the Germans and cause them to 
fight with renewed desperation.25 Hull apparently was 
convinced by Long's argument and no declaration was 
issued until a year after the Bermuda Conference. 
In fact, most of Long's ideas prevailed at the 
Bermuda Conference. There was no emphasis upon the fact 
that large numbers of the refugees were Jewish. No new 
monies were allocated to facilitate the rescue effort. 
There was no modification in the existing immigration 
24Berle to Hull and Long, 20 April 1943, container 
2 02, Long Papers 
25Long's response to Hull is mentioned in Brandt to 
Long, 23 April 1943, container 202, Long Papers. 
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laws. And, most tellingly, arrangements for the 
transportation of refugees was given such a low priority 
that in fact there was no transportation policy.26 
As late as November 1943 Long still used the "lack 
of transportation" argument to support the fact that the 
State Department was not issuing more visas. He argued 
that there were no neutral ships available and that none 
had been available since Pearl Harbor and he also told 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that military vessels 
could not be diverted from the war effort.27 Long either 
lied or forgot that there had been an offer, refused by 
Long and officers in the War Department, by U. S. Army 
authorities immediately prior to the Bermuda Conference 
to transport refugees to the United States.28 
It was the British who stated the real reason why 
the State Department and the Foreign Office of Britain 
26A11 of these points were made in Draft of Letter of 
Guidance, 13 April 1943, container 203, Long Papers. 
Those views are repeated in Long Diary, 23 June 1943. 
27House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Hearings on Resolutions Providing For the 
Establishment By the Executive of ?- Commission to 
Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People of Europe. 
78th Congress, 1st Session (1943), 22, 36. On this 
issue, David S. Wyman argues that there were neutral 
vessels available throughout the war. Wyman, The 
Abandonment of the Jews, 336, 337. 
28Memorandum of a Conversation. Long and Strong, 12 
February 1943; Long to Strong, 22 February 1943; Long to 
Atherton, 11 March, container 212, Long Papers. See also 
New York Times. 19 December 1943, 4. 
Ill 
opposed any new plan to aid European Jews. Richard Law 
of the British Foreign Office put it succinctly at the 
Bermuda Conference; Hitler might just release a large 
number of the refugees in order to relieve himself "of an 
obligation to take care of these useless people." Reams 
responded for the State Department by commenting that the 
State Department would be against negotiating with 
Germany anyway.29 This was a telling statement since the 
United States had negotiated with Germany throughout the 
war on such issues as prisoners of war, exchanges of 
civilian nationals trapped in enemy territory, and 
attempts to arrange a safe contact for refugee evacuation 
ships.30 
Also of note was the fact that Robert Alexander, who 
served as a "technical expert" at the Bermuda Conference, 
informed Long and the members of the State Department 
after the conference that he was convinced that Nazis 
spies had infiltrated Jewish organizations and were 
"really behind the [Jewish] pressure groups."31 One need 
only to have listened to the comments by Sir Herbert 
29Minutes of the Bermuda Conference Sessions, 20 
April 1943, container 203, Long Papers. 
30Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 115. 
31Confidentiai Intradepartmental Memorandum, 
Alexander to Long, 7 May 1943, container 203, Long 
Papers. 
112 
Emerson, Director of the IGC, to learn what, if any, 
progress would be made at Bermuda. His input is 
important since the British finally relented to Long's 
demand that the IGC be considered the organization 
responsible for handling all refugee affairs. Nothing, 
Emerson stated, should be done in the way of rescue if 
this in any way precluded "the efficient waging of the 
war." While this was the current excuse for inaction, 
Emerson's version translated to an even more narrow 
interpretation of the argument. To the suggestion that 
the Allies at least absorb as many refugees as Germany 
would release, he replied that this would not conform to 
the (above) "test" and that the Allies should concentrate 
on possibly rescuing a few thousand children in the 
Balkans and France.32 Comments made by Long's friends, 
Bloom and Dodds, are revealing as well. Both informed 
the press that the Germans would never allow anyone out 
of Europe unless it were "for good military reasons."33 
The American delegation set off to E jrmuda with a 
mandate to do basically nothing, except to refrain from 
tampering with existing U. S. laws. They followed their 
instructions well. 
32Emerson, Note on Measure for Rescue of Refugees, 24 
March 1943, container 203, Long Papers; New York Times, 
20 April 1943, 1. 
33New York Times, 18 April 1943, 11. 
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The two delegations remained in Bermuda for twelve 
days. Only five correspondents representing various wire 
service were permitted access to the island and no 
reporters for individual newspapers were given access to 
the conference.34 
The British opened the conference by opposing Long's 
insistence that the IGC should be revived. Long cabled 
that the British had already agreed to the IGC revival 
and that it was the "ready-made logical and natural 
instrument" for the work that needed to be done.35 The 
British were aware that the United States planned to use 
the IGC as a means to avoid action since any plan of 
rescue that the State Department could not object to 
either for reasons of national security or because it 
might hinder the war effort could be referred to the IGC 
where nothing would be done. The State Department could 
then tell its critics that it was following the proper 
procedure concerning the refugee escue effort. 
The British faced a different set of political 
problems at home and a need t change the procedure. 
They suggested that the IGC broaden its scope, increase 
its membership, and revise its mandate. In a change that 
34Kunz to Clarkson, 12 April 1943, container 203, 
Long Papers. 
35Minutes of the Bermuda refugee Conference, 24 April 
1943; Long to Dodds, container 203, Long Papers. 
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would haunt Long, the mandate was changed so that the IGC 
could negotiate with neutral and allied countries "to 
preserve, maintain and transport refugees," but could not 
negotiate with the enemy through neutrals. The word 
"refugee" was now defined as including all European 
refugees and not just those leaving the Reich; and the 
power to negotiate with Germany woulc obviously be 
rescinded. Other changes, too, were recommended and 
accepted.36 
Long handled another proposal characteristic of his 
style. The British suggested a refugee camp in North 
Africa, a plan on which they proved relentless to wrest a 
compromise from the Americans. Long, aware that to refuse 
the British proposal would mean placing them in a better 
light than his own delegation, eventually agreed to a 
compromise.37 Long, however, worried over his decision, 
employing, in fact, an argument often reserved for the 
British: Moslem sensibilities. 
The Bermuda delegates are sending us some 
difficult questions to answer.I worked late 
this evening with Dunn, Atherton, Murray and 
Brandt outlining our reply to the use of North 
African territory for an internment camp for 
36Report of the Governments of the U. S. and the 
U. K. from their Delegates to the Conference on Refugee 
Problems, held at Bermuda, April 1943, container 203, 
Long Papers. 
37Dodds to Long, 21 April 1943, container 203, Long 
Papers. 
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German, Czech, and sttceless Jews now in Spain. 
To put them in Moslem countries raises 
political questions whi .1 immediately assume a 
paramount military importance -- considering 
that of the population of 18 million behind our 
lines 14 million are Mohammedans. The 
Mohammedan world is te.iding to flare up at the 
indications that the Allied forces are trying 
to locate Jewish people under their protection 
in Moslem territory. . . . Altogether it is a 
bad tendency.38 
Once more, Breckinrida^ Long had found a reason for 
refusing to revise the refuge rescue "policy" of the 
United States State Department. 
38Long Diary, 23 April 1943. 
Chapter 7 
THE FINAL SOLUTION 
The response of Breckinridge Long and the State 
Department to the stories of Nazi atrocities against 
refugees reveals at best a problem of bureaucratic 
entanglement, at worst the possibility of a deliberately 
impervious attitude, and in the least missed 
opportunities. 
When Henrik de Kauffman, the Danish Ambassador in 
1943, informed the State Department that he had $20 
million to aid in the rescue effort, he also alluded to 
the fact that he had knowledge of atrocities that were 
committed daily by the Nazis against refugees. The State 
Department did not make use of Kauffman's offer of 
assistance; it also decided not to make public the 
contents of Kauffman's letter mentioning the atrocities. 
The rationale for the suppression of the contents of the 
letter mirrored a vintage Breckinridge Long argument. 
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Revealing the atrocities, the State Department argued, 
might "work to the disadvantage of the Jews."1 
Three years earlier. Long had written to Adolph 
Berle that he and others in the State Department knew 
that refugees would be treated poorly by Hitler. His 
argument was that a State Department announcement to that 
effect would be used either for political purposes by the 
allied nations, considered meddling in the affairs of a 
sovereign country by the neutral nations, or simply make 
matters worse for the refugees under German control.2 
Hitler had warned as early as January 1939 that 
should a war aimed at exterminating the "Aryan peoples" 
take place, "it would not be the Aryan peoples which 
would be exterminated, but Jewry."3 Throughout the war 
Hitler repeatedly promised the destruction of the Jews. 
By September 1942 many were publicly announcing their 
belief that Hitler was attempting to fulfill his 1939 
prediction about the extermination of Jewry.4 Washington 
Quoted in Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 1963), 240. 
2Long to Adolph Berle, 23 February 1940, container 
211, Long Papers. Long wrote in 1943 that "Jewish 
activism may go against them...." Long Diary 20 April 
1943 . 
3Quoted in the New York Times, 1 October 1942, 8. 
"Perhaps the first unconfirmed report of the gassing 
of Dutch Jews came in the BBC broadcast of German 
novelist Thomas Mann in September 1942. See Raul 
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had unconfirmed reports from the Polish government in 
exile that at Treblinka and other camps the Germans were 
exterminating Jewish prisoners. Jan Ciechanowski, 
Ambassador of the Polish Government in exile, was joined 
by other officials of governments in exile in his plea 
that Washington do something to retaliate against the 
atrocities he believed were taking place. He offered 
several options. He suggested that German cities should 
be bombed in retaliation for the atrocities, but 
officials in Washington rejected that proposal because 
they believed that such an action would encourage an 
escalation in the terror (thus tacitly admitting that a 
terror did exist). Another option, a public warning to 
Berlin to cease such activities, was considered by those 
at State as something that would be conceived as an idle 
threat and, considering the recent successes of the 
Germans, an act of desperation.5 
Lacking specific confirmed reports of atrocities 
against the Jews, the State Department adopted a policy 
which closely resembled the approach of Long two years 
before. He had argued that singling out the Jews could 
have repercussions in the form of a backlash against the 
Hillberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1961), 266. 
5Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Vichy (Garden City, 
N.J.: Doubleday & Co., 1947), 117-119. 
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Jews and a diminution of the war effort. Meanwhile, 
Joseph Goebbels had come to the opinion by the end of 
1942 that, while the German program against the Jews made 
headlines in the British and American press, "both the 
English and the Americans are happy that we are 
exterminating the Jewish riff-raff."6 
It is highly unlikely that anyone in the State 
Department would have been "happy" about the elimination 
of "Jewish riff-raff," yet there were those who were 
inclined to disbelieve claims about German atrocities 
that were being made by the international Jewish 
community. A case in point involved the report that came 
from the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and its director, 
Dr. Gerhart M. Riegner, in July and August 1942. 
Riegner was a Berlin refugee who had left Germany 
shortly after Hitler rose to power. He travelled to 
Geneva, studied international law, and was asked to 
become the Swiss representative for the WJC. He quickly 
established a reputation as a balanced and serious 
scholar who seldom made statements without giving careful 
consideration to their legitimacy. In July 1942, Dr. 
Riegner learned from a German industrialist that Hitler 
was planning to build gas chambers for the purpose of 
exterminating millions of European Jews. At first 
6Quoted in Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 169. 
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incredulous, Riegner immediately checked the credibility 
of the industrialist, Dr. Edward Schulte. He learned 
that Schulte had on two previous occasions provided 
accurate information to Allied intelligence. Riegner was 
inclined to believe Schulte's claims: since the invasion 
of Poland Riegner had documented mistreatment of Jewish 
prisoners at ^ne hands of the Nazis and, as director of 
the WJC, had daily received information of increasing 
atrocities directed solely toward those unfortunate Jews 
in Nazi occupied territories. After examining the 
evidence and consulting his friend and law school mentor 
Paul Guggenheim, Gerhart Riegner telegraphed the 
President of the WJC, Stephen Wise, that he was convinced 
that the Germans intended to exterminate 3-4 million 
Jews, probably through the use of prussic acid. Although 
he admitted that the information could not be confirmed, 
he also noted that his informant was reliable. 
Guggenheim, more skeptical, appended a note of doubt to 
the telegram sent by Riegner, but he also paved the way 
for Riegner to present his case to the United States 
Government.7 
7Walter Lacquer and Richard Brietman, Breaking the 
Silence (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 1-8, 
118 ff; Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: 
Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 63-64; Walter 
Lacquer, "The Mysterious Messenger and the Final 
Solution," Commentary (March 1980): 55. 
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Riegner met and talked to Howard Etling, Jr., who 
was the U. S. Vice Consul in Geneva. Etling believed 
that Riegner would not have approached the American 
Consulate unless he was convinced of the accuracy of his 
claims. He persuaded the American legation to forward 
Riegner's accusations to Washington; but Leland Harrison, 
Etling's superior in Bern, attached a disclaimer stating 
that he believed it to be another one of those "war 
rumors." The State Department accepted Harrison's 
explanation. The only real controversy involved whether 
or not Rabbi W ^e should be informed by the State 
Department that it had received the information. The 
State Department voted to withhold the information from 
Rabbi Wise. Finally, on August 28, Wise received a copy 
of the report from British MP and Chairman of the British 
section of the WJC, Samuel Sydney Silverman.8 
Meanwhile the State Department stuck to its decision 
not to accept the claims put forward by Riegner and the 
WJC unti_ further corroboration was available. Roosevelt 
did, however, hold a press conference to clear the air. 
He was aware of stories of atrocities, he claimed, and he 
would welcome any further trustworthy information. He 
8Friedman, No Haven, 131; Wyman, The Abandonment of 
the Jews, 43, 44; Morse, While Six Million Died, 9; 
Stephen S. Wise, The Challenging Years: The 
Autobiography of Stephen Wise (New York: G. P. Putnam and 
Sons, 1949), 275 
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did not mention either Riegner or the claims made by the 
director of the WJC.9 
The information he requested came within three 
months. In that period of time, however, the State 
Department did not acknowledge what now appears to be a 
mountain of evidence to support the claim originally put 
forward by Riegner. For example, when Rabbi Stephen Wise 
contacted Sumner Welles to gain his support, Welles 
expressed the opinion that was held by most of the State 
Department officials and, it appears, Roosevelt, that 
those Jews who were transported east were sent to the 
camps to build fortifications in order to fight the 
Russians. Meanwhile, the European Division of the State 
Department tried to squelch a telegram from the WJC in 
London which implored Wise to go public with his 
information. 
Given more information from Jacob Rosenheim, 
President of the Agudath Israel World Organization, that 
extermination, war under way in Poland, Wise 
unsuccessfully attempted through Supreme Court Justice 
Felix Frankfurter to persuade Roosevelt to say something 
publicly. Welles met with a delegation, including Wise, 
9Lacquer and Brietmann, Breaking The Silence, 151. 
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but the State Department failed to act or make any public 
statement.10 
As more information poured in to confirm the 
oricrinal claims of Schulte and Riegner, the State 
Department slowly moved to acknowledge that the 
extermination of European Jews was in fact taking place. 
Welles informed Wise in a hastily arranged meeting that 
while the Rabbi could go public with its information, the 
State Department could not. Accordingly, Wise held two 
press conferences on November 25th and 26th to rally the 
world against the horror that was taking place. At the 
same time, reports emerged from Palestine that confirmed 
the existence of crematoriums at Auschwitz.11 
Assistant Secretary Long, aware of what was taking 
place in the State Department, did not appear to have 
been directly involved in the Department's decisions 
concerning the possession of evidence of a Nazi 
extermination policy. He was, however, much concerned 
10Wise to Frankfurter, 4 September and 16 September 
1942, in Carl Herman Voss, ed. Stephen S. Wise; Servant 
of the People: Selected Letters (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1969), 249-251; Wise, The Challenging Years, 
275; Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 45-46. Long was 
aware of what was going on. See Long Diary, 12-13, 26 
September 1942, for a recapitulation of the episode from 
the State Department point of view. 
11New York Times, 11 November 1942, 10; ibid, 25 
November 1942, 10; ibid., 26 November 1942, 16. See also 
Morse, While Six Million Died, 18-21 and Wise, The 
Challenging Years. 275-276. 
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with a letter he had received from Ales Hrdlicka of the 
Smithsonian Institution and his response was indicative 
of the approach prevalent in the State Department. 
Hrdlicka had suggested as a postwar possibility for the 
handling of the immigration of refugees from Europe that 
the "favored Americas" should be considered. Long could 
not conceal his disgust for such a proposal, noting 
acidly in his diary that he was "awaiting the descent of 
the locusts."12 
Two months later Long became more directly involved 
in the issue of the State Department's response to Nazi 
atrocities. While still considering the rescue efforts 
for the 1000 Jewish children left in Vichy France and 
even more worried about a hostile attack in the press 
upon the State Department in general and himself in 
particular,13 Long was visited by Assistant Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, Dr. Nahum Goldman (who represented 
the Jewish Agency for Palestine), and the son of Rabbi 
Stephen Wise. The three ...ad appealed to Long to request 
that the State "epartment give some aid to provide food 
for the Jews m the Warsaw ghetto. Long agreed, provided 
12Long Diary, 21 July 1942. 
13Long Diary, 12, 13 September 1942. The attack in 
the press was considered by Long to be so vicious that he 
only dropped consideration of legal action after his 
friends advised that it would be unwise even to recognize 
the "ravings of a Communist." 
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there was a proper transfer of credit from the Treasury 
Department for the State Department to authorize $12,000 
a month to go to Portugal so that food could be provided 
to the Warsaw Jews.14 Long immediately contacted Hull, 
who agreed with Long that his decision was a "purely 
political decision." Long wrote that he "did not want 
that policy along with others to serve as the basis for 
antagonism towards us after this war...so that is our 
policy."15 Long was also convinced that the United 
States had to play the political game because of the 
proximity between the British government and the "refugee 
governments surrounding her in London." If the U.S. did 
not appear to side with the refugee governments now, Long 
wrote, they would not support the United States "when the 
time comes to sit around the Peace table. They would be 
committed to the English point of view, whatever that 
might be."16 
In the end the catalyst for official recognition 
that atrocities were taking place inside Poland came from 
London. In October 1942 a war crimes commission was 
established and on 17 December 1942 an Anglo-American 
declaration denounced the Nazi implementation of 
14Long Diary, 29 September 1942. 
15Long Diary, 1 October 1942. 
16Long Diary, 28 September 1942. 
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Hitler's oft repeated intention to exterminate 
the Jewish people in Europe. From all the 
occupied countries Jews are being transported 
in conditions of appalling horror and brutality 
to Eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been 
made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the 
Ghettos established by the German invader are 
being systematically emptied of all Jews except 
a few highly skilled workers required for war 
industries. None of those taken away are ever 
heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly 
worked to death in labor camps. The infirm are 
left to die of exposure and starvation or are 
deliberately massacred in mass executions. The 
number of victims of these bloody cruelties is 
reckoned in many hundreas of thousands of 
entirely innocent men, women and children. 
The statement continued that all the concerned 
governments 
condemn in the strongest possible terms the 
bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. 
They declare that such events can only 
strengthen the resolve of all freedom loving 
peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite 
tyranny. They re-affirm their solemn 
resolution to ensure that those responsible for 
these crimes shall not escape retribution and 
to press on with the necessary practical 
measures to this end.17 
Although the intent was humanitarian and the expression 
noble, the State Department press release was in fact a 
continuation of the policy that the Roosevelt 
administration had followed from the beginning of the war 
in 1939. Faced with evidence that extermination was 
taking place and aware that silence in the face of such 
evidence would be politically damaging following the end 
17State Department Press release, 16 December 1942, 
container 212, Long Papers. 
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of the war, the United States could no longer remain 
quiet. However, as late as one week before the press 
release the members of the European Division of the State 
Department had attempted to block any public 
pronouncement by the administration.18 While the State 
Department followed a policy in the time between the Nazi 
invasion of Russia and Riegner's revelations which was 
supposedly designed to protect the security of the United 
States, approximately one and one half million Jews had 
been murdered. In the three months between Riegner's 
call for action and the State Department's press release, 
approximately one million more Jews were killed.19 Even 
after the press release the operative word was 
"practical" and that came to mean a substitution of a 
"rescue through victory" stance for the "internal 
security" position. 
The "rescue through victory" approach stressed the 
fact that little could be done to aid those unfortunate 
enough to be in the hands of the Nazi officials. 
Therefore the most rapid and most practical approach, it 
was argued, would be to defeat the Nazis as rapidly as 
possible. Any other plan, however well meaning, would 
18Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy and 
European Jewry, 159. 
19Hillberg, Destruction of the Jews, 718. 
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simply hinder the war effort. In the words of Harold W. 
Dodds, leader of the American delegation to the Bermuda 
Conference in 1943, such an approach "would not only be 
foolish, it would be criminal."20 
Reluctance on the part of the European Division of 
the State Department to change policy reflected the 
beliefs of Breckinridge Long. Long delayed for almost a 
year acceptance of the evidence and then qualified his 
acceptance. In an interdepartmental memorandum of May 
1943, Long acknowledged that he had received periodic 
reports "of the massacre of Jews, including the aged, 
infirm, women, and children." He made it clear, however, 
that the "details as to the exact location of these 
reported massacres and the actual number of lives taken 
have not been reported." And, tellingly, he noted that 
"it may for present purposes be accepted as more than 
Jewish propaganda that a large number of Jews had been 
killed" (italics added).21 Three months later the State 
Department continued to treat reports as allegations. 
Sumner Welles, in a conversation with Dr. A. London, the 
Netherlands Ambassador, sought "proof" that the refugees 
who were sent to Poland "were almost in their entirety 
20Department of State Bulletin, VII (7 April 1943), 
351. 
^Interdepartmental Memorandum, "Number and Location 
of Refugees," 14 May 1943, container 203, Long Papers. 
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liquidated by the German officials stationed in 
Poland. "22 
In March 1943 Congressman Celler and several Jewish 
Congressmen met with President Roosevelt in order to 
express their displeasure with the refugee policy as 
promoted by the State Department and enforced with rigor 
by Breckinridge Long. Roosevelt's response was to refer 
them to the State Dep "tment. One historian, Henry 
Feingold, has claimed that Roosevelt was playing his 
usual policy with the State Department. Roosevelt was 
not inclined to utilize the Department in the making of 
foreign policy, Feingold has written, but he would often 
use it as a "scapegoat for hostility generated by an 
unpopular policy."23 Hull was aware of the way that 
Roosevelt handled matters and he was very protective that 
no further erosion would take place in the influence of 
the State Department within the administration. Long 
also was cognizant of Roosevelt's gambits.24 
22Memorandum of Conversation, Netherlands Ambassador, 
Dr. A. London and Under Secretary Mr. Welles, 13 August 
1943, container 202, in Long Papers. 
"Feingold, Politics of Rescue, 177-178, 
24See Long Diary, 16 December 1940, 22 April 1942, 
and 4 September 1943. See also clipping of St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. 5 September 1943 container 5, in Long 
Diary. 
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Long had previous _y attempted to counter criticism 
of the State Department and himself when Assistant 
Secretary Berle requested the State Department in 1940 to 
release a condemnation of Nazi barbarity. Long countered 
with a memorandum that expressed sympathy with the "poor 
people involved" but did not recommend that the State 
Department should "make public expression of our 
feeling." it would be interference with the internal 
affairs of another country, he argued, and also "we would 
not be able to implement ^ur protest."25 
Early in his career as Assistant Secretary Long 
worked towards modifying action which could have been 
taken on the reception of news of Nazi atrocity against 
the Jews. Stopping news at its source became after 1941 
routine for Long, since after the United States went to 
war much of the information passed was transmitted by 
diplomatic pouch and cable through the State Department. 
This was a privilege which had been extended to Gerhardt 
Riegner; and the informacion could be withheld for 
security reasons. The State Department had on several 
occasions been accused of suppressing information.26 
25Long to EU, 23 February 1940, container 202, Long 
Papers. 
26See Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 179. 
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Long also was not above, indeed did not attempt to 
hide, his belief that information favorable to the State 
Department could be planted in the press. He was not as 
open about his desire to manage or manipulate unfavorable 
information.27 On 7 May 1943 Long suggested planting an 
article in Colliers to counteract unfavorable information 
which had appeared casting a poor light upon the rescue 
efforts of the State Department.28 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the State 
Department's response to a telegram by Leland Harrison in 
late January 1943 was not as Harrison had hoped. 
Harrison had forwarded news that reports of Nazi 
atrocities were increasing. Sumner W«._les, responding 
for the State Department, informed Harrison that he 
should no longer "accept reports" which had been given to 
him by "private persons in the United States unless such 
action is advisable because of extraordinary 
circumstance." Such private reports, Harrison was 
informed, might cause the neutral countries from which 
they came to retaliate by restricting the transmission of 
"confidential official matter" important to the United 
27See Long Diary, 17 February 1940; 3 April 1943. 
28See Confidential Intradepartmental Memorandum, 7 
May 1943, container 203, Long Papers. Feingold argues 
that the State Department planted several spy stories in 
popular magazines in order to enhance its position; see 
Politics of Rescue, 334. 
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States.29 It appears now that Sumner Welles was not the 
author of that telegram to Harrison; it is highly 
probable that he only signed it as a matter of routine. 
What is interesting is that the real sources of the 
telegram were James C. Dunn, Ray Atherton, John D. 
Hickerson, and Elbridge Durbow, all high level officials 
in the European Division of the State Department and all 
friends and associates of Long.30 Harrison requested 
that Welles and the State Department reconsider the 
import of the telegram, reminding Welles how reliable 
Riegner had been in the past. Coming on the heels of 
revelations in the New York Times that the Rumanian 
government had offered to cooperate in the moving of 
70,000 Jews to any place selected by the Allies and the 
inadvertent discovery by the Treasury Department that the 
State Department had ignored the Rumanian offer, Welles 
complied with Harrison's request.31 In the meantime on 
27 April 1943 the State Department cabled its approval to 
29Quoted in "The Morgenthau Diaries: VI, The Refugee 
Runaround," Colliers, 120(1 Nov. 1947), 23. 
30Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews. 81. 
3:lNew York Times, 13 February 1943, 5. For a 
detailed account of the attempts by the State Department 
to suppress news of the Final Solution, see "The 
Morgenthau Diaries, VI, The Refugee Run-Around," 
Colliers. 120 ( 1 November 1947, 23 ff; Stephen Wise, The 
Challenging Years, 275 ff; and Arthur Morse, While Six 
Million Died, 3-11, 16-19. 
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Harrison's request conditioned by the selection of which 
cables to pass to Rabbi Wise. Welles, too, figured out 
State's attempt to suppress news of the "Final Solution," 
but was not in any position to act.32 Welles also 
forwarded to Rabbi Wise on that same day Riegner's latest 
message which detailed a relief and rescue effort to be 
carried out by the WJC on behalf of Rumanian Jews and a 
request for funds for orphans hiding in France trying to 
escape to Spain and North Africa. Riegner's plan 
guaranteed that no money would end up in Axis territory 
during the war. Wise asked Welles to recommend to the 
Treasury office that the WJC be granted a license to 
deposit in Bern a substantial amount of money to finance 
the rescue plan.33 
The previous year the State Department had blocked 
aid to the Polish ghettos on the grounds that such aid 
would violate the Allied blockade and hinder the "rescue 
through victory" effort. At the same time, it had 
permitted the shipping of 15,000 tons of wheat and 3,000 
tons of other goods to fight against starvation in Nazi- 
held Greece. A license was not granted to the AJJDC 
until 11 December 1942. The license came too late to be 
32Clipping St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 September 1943, 
container 202, Long Papers; Clipping "The Washington 
Merry-Go-Round," 26 August 1943, ibid. 
33Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, 127, 128. 
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of any assistance to many Polish Jews. The WJC in early 
1943 worked tirelessly to get the State Department to 
allow food packages to be sent to individuals in the 
Warsaw Ghetto and to those deported from Allied countries 
to Eastern Europe. The Board of Economic Warfare earlier 
had moved to grant this privilege to both war prisoners 
and civilian internees. The State Department, the Board, 
and the ICRC (involved in the Greek rescue effort) all 
delayed their response to the WJC. The State Department 
wanted proof that the Germans guaranteed its workability. 
There was little doubt as to what the outcome of that 
request would be.34 Long was aware at that time that the 
Germans would not feed the Jews. He wrote in his diary 
that Nazi behavior toward the ews was "inhumane in the 
extreme--almost incredible;" he expected little from 
them.35 
Furthermore, the rescue mission of Rumanian and 
French Jewish orphans revealed a growing rift in the 
State Department and much of that division focused around 
Long. Following Riegner's advice that the rescue and aid 
effort would pose neither an economic nor a military 
problem, Welles contacted Herbert Feis, the State 
Department's economic advisor, and Bernard Meltzer, 
34Ibid. , 124-26. 
35Long Diary, 29 September 1942. 
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acting chief of Spate's Foreign Funds Control Division. 
These two men had previous experience with Long and were 
determined to keep the rescue possibility alive during 
the time of the Bermuda Conference. Feis and Meltzer, 
through Harrison, requested more information from 
Riegner. Riegner's response only sharpened the division 
within the State Department. Now it appeared that Feis 
and Meltzer ran directly of afoul of Long, George Brandt, 
Long's executive assistant, and R. Borden Reams, Long's 
specialist on refugee matters. Also aligned against them 
were Ray Atherton (European Division), Wallace Murray 
(Near Eastern specialist), and James Dunn (Political 
Affairs). All supported the same refugee policy as Long 
and agreed with Long's argument that foreign currency 
would be available to the enemy and would therefore 
relieve the Germans of any responsibility for caring for 
the people who were under their jurisdiction.36 Long 
and other members of the Department had been aware for 
more than six months that Rumania had not taken care of 
its Jewish population and had been sending out peace 
feelers.37 Rumania's tentative peace actions all but 
36Penkower, Jews Were Expendable, 12 9; Brietman and 
Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 186. 
See, particularly, Reams to Stettinius, 8 October 1943, 
copy in container 203, Long Papers. 
37Long Diary, 23 March 1943. 
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removed the plausibility of the economic warfare 
argument. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, upon being 
informed that the State Department was resisting aid to 
Rumanian Jews because it would aid the Nazi war effort, 
stated that such a position by the State Department 
appeared odd because the "State Department was usually 
among those who scoffed at economic warfare in other 
connections. "38 
Long's Spec_al Division finally made one concession 
to Meltzer; he could present his case to the Treasury 
Department only if it utilized the economic warfare 
argument. Wnile ^ong apparently believed that bringing 
in the Treasury Department would be politically 
expedient, adding one more bureaucratic process to an 
already bloated procedure, it in actuality marked the 
beginning of the end for Long and his stringent visa 
policy. John Pehle, the Foreign Funds Controls Director 
for the Treasury Department, received Riegner's report on 
15 June 19.3 and could see no real objections that could 
be raised against the plan. One month later a meeting 
between State Department and Treasury Department 
"Quoted in "The Morgenthau Diaries, VI, The Refugee 
Runaround," Colliers, 120( 1 November 1947): 23, 62. 
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officials revealed that there would be more delay.39 R. 
Borden Reams, as Long's specialist on refugee matters, at 
first argued against the plan on the basis of its 
inability to keep U. S. money out of the hands of the 
enemy. When Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., Treasury's Assistant 
General Counsel, presented a foolproof plan for keeping 
U. S. dollars from getting into German hands, however. 
Reams fell back on the argument that since only 30,000 
places remained under the British White Paper there was 
no place available for the refugees to go.40 Treasury 
officials, unimpressed by Reams' argument, moved to 
implement the plan.41 
Rabbi Wise, anxious to get the plan in action, met 
with Roosevelt 22 July 1943 and the President endorsed 
the plan. The next day Morgenthau informed the Rabbi 
39Penkower, Jews were Expendable, 12 9; Wyman, 
Abandonment of the Jews, 180. For the best account of 
this entire episode, see Arthur Morse, While Six Million 
Died, 73-86. 
40See Reams to Long, 7 May 1943, container 203, Long 
Papers, for a further indication that this had been the 
argument of Long and Reams fully two months before the 
State Department and Treasury Department meeting. 
41For additional information about the licensing 
issue, see Graham H. Stuart, Memorandum: Confidential, 
Special War Problems Division, 27 May 1944, Division of 
Research and Publication, War Records File, in container 
204, Long Papers; Reams to Stett_nius, 8 October 1943, 
container 203. Long Papers; Wyman, Abandonment of the 
Jews, 180; Penkower. Jews Were Expendable, 13 0; and 
Morse, While Six Million Died, 67. 
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that the plan could begin as soon as there was an 
exchange of cables between the State Department and the 
American legation in Bern. A week later the Treasury 
Department informed the AJC that it was prepared to begin 
the plan.42 Hull informed Morgenthau that the plan was 
permissible since no funds would fall into enemy hands 
and that the State Department would notify the legation 
in Bern that such was the case. A full month passed 
before the State Department cabled its approval of the 
Riegner plan. 
What had happened? It now appears that Long and his 
associates had not abandoned their opposition to the 
plan, even though it was approved by the President, and, 
using the discredited economic warfare argument, delayed 
the implementation of the program by almost seven weeks. 
Harrison, who initially supported the Riegner plan, was 
confused and inter-Departmental politics played no small 
part in the confusion and delay. Harrison, upon 
receiving notification .rom the Treasury Department that 
the license would be issued, followed proper procedure 
and waited to receive the proper instructions from his 
immediate superiors. When he received the State 
Department cable on 28 September, he informed the State 
42Wise, The Challenging Years, 277-278; Stuart 
Memorandum, 27 May 1944, container 204, Long Papers. 
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Department, not the Treasury Department, of problems that 
might develop with the British government. Ten days 
passed before the Treasury Department learned of 
Harrison's reservations and it wasn't until 28 October 
that Randolph Paul, acting for Morgenthau, received a 
copy of Harrison's cable. Paul, furious at the delay, 
informed Breckinridge Long that for a number of reasons 
British clearance of the project was not necessary.43 
In the meantime, Long, aware that Reams opposed any 
plan which he thought might benefit "a special group of 
enemy aliens," still insisted that the IGC should be the 
proper agency for handling such a matter. He nonetheless 
cabled Harrison 26 October 1943 and informed him to go 
ahead with the plan.44 Harrison delayed. He consulted 
the British and discovered that they still opposed the 
plan by Riegner. Harrison requested authority from the 
State Department before he would implement a plan that 
was directly in defiance of the British. 
Morgenthau was aghast at the annecessary delay. 
While he chastised Pehle for his failure to consult the 
British, he also told his associates that the real 
"Stuart Memorandum, 27 May 1944, container 203, Long 
Papers; Long Diary, 28 October 1943; Wyman, Abandonment 
of the Jews, 181. 
44Breckinridge Long Memorandum, 26 October 1943, 
container 2 03, Long Papers. 
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problem lay with the British and Hull's associates; and 
he approved a letter to Hull by Pehle after modifying the 
harsher portions of the communication. Hull was asked to 
cable the U. S. Ambassador to Britain, John G. Winant, 
and to request that Winant tell the British that the plan 
was fully safeguarded.45 Winant delivered the 
information and relayed to the State Department that the 
British had really opposed the Riegner plan because there 
was no place to put the refugees should they be rescued. 
At this point Meltzer learned from Josiah DuBois at the 
Treasury Department that the British had been aware of 
Riegner's proposed rescue plan from the time that he had 
first suggested it. It seemed apparent to Morgenthau's 
assistants that individuals at State had deliberately 
blocked Riegner's plan and obfuscated at every possible 
instance. Morgenthau's assirtants now pushed for the 
Secretary to argue for the removal of the refugee issue 
from the authority of the State Department. Morgenthau, 
obviously hoping to avoid a showdown cattle with Hull, 
arranged for a meeting to take place 2 0 December between 
Morgenthau and his assistants and Hull and his 
assistants. He sent a memorandum to Hull explaining the 
problems that had arisen. When he arrived at the 
45Stuart Memorandum, 27 May 1944, container 203, Long 
Papers. 
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meeting, Morgenthau, accompanied by Pehle and Randolph 
Paul learned that Long had cabled Winant two days before 
expressing "astonishment" that the problem had occurred. 
On that same day, Long had cabled Harrison in Bern and 
instructed him to issue the license to Riegner and the 
WJC. Harrison reported that he personally handed the 
license to Riegner. It had been eight months since 
Riegner had requested funds for the rescue and aid 
effort. 
Hull's action and reactions at both the 20 December 
1943 and the 11 January 1944 conferences with Morgenthau 
and other Treasury Department officials revealed the 
confusion that existed at the State Department. In the 
December conference Hull claimed that the "fellows down 
the line" (his subordinates), although sincere, had made 
a mess of things. In the January conference Hull 
appeared to be totally confused. He had been briefed by 
the Treasury Department on the issues, but he seemed to 
be unprepared. He was unable to introduce four of the 
five State Department officials who had been active in 
the rescue-refugee issue and who were attending the 
conference with him, and he grudgingly agreed with 
Morgenthau's assessment that the State Department's 
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rescue record was "most shocking." Morgenthau wrote that 
Hull appeared to be "simply bewildered."46 
Following the conference, Morgenthau reached the 
conviction that he could no longer leave the matter of 
the refugees in the hands of the State Department. He 
knew that Roosevelt's record in relation to Hull was that 
he would not move against him and he was convinced that 
"Hull wouldn't move on Long."47 
Morgenthau saw Long as the key to the situation. 
Long had attended the 2 0 December conference and 
Morgenthau had confronted him directly with the fact that 
several people saw him as a hindrance to the rescue 
plans. When Long attempted to place the fault on the 
people "down the line" in both departments and 
specifically singled out Meltzer as responsible for 
spreading rumors about anti-Semitism in the State 
Department, Morgenthau turned to Long and said "Well, 
Breck...we might be a little frank. The impression is 
all around [that] you, particularly, are anti-semi; ic." 
Long denied that he was anti-Semitic and asked Morgenthau 
46Quoted in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 22 0; 
see also "Morgenthau Diaries," 65. 
47Quoted in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 220. 
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to use his "good offices to correct that impression, 
because I am not. " 48 
Long had assured Morgenthau at the December 
conference that the State Department was not of the same 
opinion as the British in regards to the rescue of 70,000 
Rumanian Jews. Morgenthau managed to get Hull to ask 
Long to send over a copy of a telegram sent to Bern by 
the State Department in February 1943 . Long at first 
protested but finally agreed. There was good reason for 
his protest, and Morgenthau knew why. The February 
telegram showed an attempt by the State Department to 
suppress news about the Final Solution and, even more 
damning, referred to an earlier telegram which contained 
Riegner's report reconfirming the Nazi extermination 
plan. Although Long complied, he did not give them a 
true copy of the telegram. He simply provided a summary 
which omitted all reference to the previous telegram (the 
one which contained Riegner's report). Unfortunately for 
Long, Josiah DuBois of the Treasury Department had seen a 
true copy of the February telegram and the Treasury 
Department requested and received the next day a copy of 
• • « 49 
the telegram containing Riegner's report. 
48Quoted in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 218, 
219; see also Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 185. 
49Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 22 0, 221; Wyman, 
Abandonment of the Jews, 185-86. 
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Outraged by the circuitous reasoning of the State 
Department, frustrated over more delays in the licensing 
process, alarmed at the ineptness bordering upon 
incompetence of Hull in the refugee situation, and 
totally lacking any trust in either Long or his 
associates at the State Department, Morgenthau decided to 
press Roosevelt for the removal of the refugee problem 
from the hands of the Sti-te Department. Randolph Paul 
prepared the report which Morgenthau took to the 
President. Titled "Report to the Secretary on the 
Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the 
Jews," the report was harsh. It accused the State 
Department of willfully failing to rescue the Jews from 
the time in August 1942 when it had learned of the news 
of a Nazi extermination policy. Much of the blame was 
levied at Long and his associates. They were accused of 
using national security to hold immigration below the 
available quotas and frustrating private programs which 
could have saved Jewish refugee lives. The report also 
included the two important telegrams and implied that 
Long and the State Department used the IGC to delay 
action on refugee rescue efforts. It was, to say the 
least, a damning report.50 
50Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 22 0-221; Wyman, 
Abandonment of the Jews, 187, 188. 
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What is odd is the fact that Long, who kept records 
of everything in which he was involved and copies of 
almost everything that crossed his desk, left no records 
of these events. Neither in his diaries, letters, 
memorandums, and notes at that time nor in subsequent 
records did Long either defend or explain his actions. 
In November 1943 Breckinridge Long appeared before 
Congress and gave his public answer in defense of his 
refugee policies. 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
Dissatisfaction with the inaction of the State 
Department by refugee advocates led, in July 1943, to a 
meeting in New York of an Emergency Conference to Save 
the Jews of Europe. The meeting, which took place 20-25 
Juli at the Hotel Commodore, resulted in the creation of 
an "Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of 
Europe" (Emergency Committee). The Emergency Committee 
had one goal: to persuade the United States government 
to create an agency, independent of th-? U. S. State 
Department, to rescue the Jews of Europe. 
Breckinridge Long faced several dilemmas. He 
supported one of the decisions reached by the Bermuda 
Conference; the recommendation that the IGC be 
restructured and strengthened. He also did not want to 
see the Emergency Committee's recommendations adopted 
because that would eliminate the necessity of the IGC. 
In addition, he had seen the Visa Division removed from 
his Special Division in September and transferred to 
Under Secretary Stettinius's office. This injury to his 
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pride followed an ever greater disappointment when 
Stettinius was promoted instead of Long to be Under 
Secretary of State following the departure of Sumner 
Welles.1 
Long handled the situation as well as he could, 
attempting to exert damage control until the very last. 
He hand delivered the order for transfer of the Visa 
Division to the Secretary, telling him that he felt he 
had "won all the battles and the war in the immigration 
fight" and that he was delivering a smooth operating 
program. He also informed the Secretary that he [Long] 
had been subjected to "vilification and abuse" by the 
"radicals" because of his 
fair administration of the issues involved and 
while I would not quit in a fight I felt that 
having won I would take this instant to be 
relieved o^ that work...1 wanted to be free of 
that job after three and a half years of 
handling the most complex and worst job in the 
Government.2 
Long turned over the Visa Division before Stettinius 
officially received his appointment because he did not 
want it to appear thac it had been "taken away from me 
and I had been repudiated."3 
^ee Departmental Order, 13 September 1943, 
container 212, Long Papers. 
2Long Diary, 13 September 1943. 
3Ibid. 
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In fact, however, that had been the case. Long 
confided to his diary almost two weeks later that he was 
happy to be finished with the "executive detail concerned 
with the supervision of the very active division;" he was 
obviously tired and felt defeated.4 
Meanwhile, Congressional support for the Emergency 
Committee's proposal was strong enough that the House 
Committee on Foreign Relations, with Long's friend Sol 
Bloom as Chairman, called hearings to determine whether 
the Emergency Committee's proposal should be acted upon. 
Before he gave his testimony, Long wrote to Senator 
Elbert D. Thomas (Dem., Utah) that a new committee would 
simply "interrupt the relationships already established 
within the Intergovernmental Committee and might affect 
adversely the contribution this Government can make 
towards a solution of the refugee problem."5 Long was 
disturbed by the powerful backing that he believed the 
Emergency Committee had in Congress. To stifle those who 
said that nothing had been done. Long authorized the 
release of the "Final Report" of the Bermuda Conference 
on the day following the introduction of House 
Resolutions 350 and 352. He did not achieve what he had 
4Long Diary, 26 September 1943. 
5Long to (Senator Elbert D.) Thomas, 27 October 
1943, container 203, Long Papers. 
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wished. Richard Law, a member of the British delegation 
to the Bermuda Conference, believed that he understood 
the State Department's action in Bermuda. He recalled 
twenty two years later that the Bermuda Conference had 
been a "facade for inaction." When pressed further for a 
response, he had responded "there were no results that I 
can recall."6 
It should not be surprising that Long believed that 
the hearings to establish a separate organization for 
refugee rescue were a result of "Jewish agitation" and a 
direct attack upon himself. He managed, however, to 
convince the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
that the State Department and the Intergovernmental 
Committee had done everything possible to save the Jews 
of Europe.7 
Long began his testimony by attempting to overwhelm 
the Congressmen with statistics relating to the many 
6Quoted in Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died, 
63 . 
7Long Diary, 1 January and 24 January 1944; U. S. 
Congress, Committee On Foreign Relations, Hearings on 
Resolutions Providing or the Establishment by the 
Executive of a Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the 
Jewish People of Europe on House Resolutions 350 and 352 
and Senate Resolution 203. 78th Congress, 1st Session, 9 
November 1943, 35. Hereafter House Rescue Commission 
Hearings; United Press teletype [sic]. 10 December 1943, 
in container 203, Long Papers. 
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accomplishments of the Roosevelt Administration relating 
to refugees. He praised the work of the IGC, stating 
We decided that the thing to do since we already had 
a number of governments party to this, was to 
revitalize it, reform it, reinvigorate it, hitch up 
the horses to the old surrey and go down the road 
with it. That was the best instrument we had at 
hand.8 
In his praise of the actions of the IGC, Long never let 
the Congressmen forget that the State Department had 
always placed first the furthering of the war effort. He 
believed no need for a new agency existed; the IGC and 
the State Department were doing the best that could be 
done considering the circumstances. Long's praise of the 
work of the IGC is curious because at the same time the 
hearings were conducted the IGC had in essence tabled a 
recommendation, suggested by Roosevelt to Under Secretary 
of State Edward R. Stettinius, that additional refugee 
camps and offices, staffed by Americans, could be 
established in various countries o aid Jewish refugees 
attempting to escape the Nazis.9 
8House Rescue Commission Hearings, 32. 
^Stettinius to Long, 11 November 1943, container 
203, Long Papers. See also Wyman, The Abandonment of the 
Jews, 156. For other examples of Long's knowledge that 
the IGC usually did nothing about rescue plans handed to 
it by the State Department, see Long to [George] Brandt, 
12 August 1943, container 203, Long Papers; Memo of a 
Conversation, Long with [Peter] Bergson and [Ira] 
H-rschmann, 13 September 1943, ibid.; Penkower, The 
Jews Were Expendable, 135, 136. 
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His four-hour testimony on 26 November, given at his 
insistence in executive session, is revealing. There 
were, however, glaring anomalies and misrepresentations 
in Long's testimony. Will Rogers, Jr., Democratic 
Congressman from California, noted for example that the 
IGC did not even have offices in the United States. 
Long's credibility was seriously weakened by Congressman 
Rogers' questions regarding the correctness of the IGC's 
right to negotiate with enemies through neutral parties. 
Instead of using his standard argument against 
negotiation in any way with the Axis, Long surprised 
rescue advocates sitting on the Committee when he 
insisted that the IGC had the power and that members of 
the IGC were "given plenary authority to do whatever they 
can within and without Germany and the occupied 
territories. "10 
The question of negotiation was asked in order to 
determine if a new agency would be nothing more than a 
duplicate of the _3C and if so a solution for the current 
dilemma of whether or not to form a new agency. Long's 
astonishing revelation came as a relief to some of the 
Congressmen and the assistant Secretary offered to 
10House Rescue Commission Hearings, 32, 35; 
"Statement on the Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment 
No. 23 (24 December 1943): 4; New York Times, 24 
November 1943, 13. 
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arrange for the public release of the IGC's new mandate 
but the new mandate did not provide for negotiation in 
any way with the Axis or satellite states.11 Ample 
evidence proves that Long consistently opposed such 
negotiations. He set the ground rules for the American 
Delegation to Bermuda and had stricken such a proposal 
from the delegation's agenda.12 Moreover both the 
preliminary and final reports from the Conference 
specifically rejected such negotiations. Harold Dodds 
had described the idea as "criminal," while Long's 
friend, R. E rden Reams, had claimed that it was 
absolutely "foolish."13 Long apparently convinced the 
Committee that a new agency was not necessary, and the 
Committee, in fact, asked Long his opinion on the 
resolutions. He carefully avoided suggesting that the 
resolutions should be voted down. Instead he replied 
that while its passage might be construed as a 
"See United Press Teletype [sic], 10 December 1943, 
in container 2 03, Long Papers; see also "Statement of the 
Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment, 4. 
12
"Memorandum to American Delegation," 17 April 1943, 
container 203, Long Papers; House Rescue Commission 
Hearings, 32. 
"Department of State Bulletin, 8(17 April 1943) : 
351; "Report to the Governments of the United States and 
the United Kingdom from their Delegates to the Conference 
on the Refugee Problem Held at Bermuda, April 1943," in 
container 203, Long Papers. 
153 
repudiation of the work of the State Department and the 
IGC, 
I think it would be very dangerous to vote it 
down, very unwise, in a way. I think this is a 
very important moment in the history of the 
refugee movement, and I think the Jewish people 
are looking forward to this action and the 
decision of the Committee and I think if an 
entirely negative action were taken here it 
would be misconstrued and might react against 
the Jewish people under German control.14 
At this point the Committee members must have 
wondered just what Long wanted. He obviously could not 
tell them to kill the resolution and survive the public 
uproar which would follow. Their answer was to shelve 
the measure. They did not know, however, that the 
disengenuity of the testimony that Long gave would lead 
to the creation of a new agency. 
In his testimony Long had referred to a "neutral 
Government" which had asked the Germans to release 20,000 
Jewish children from Germany. This neutral Government 
was to care for the children and the United States was to 
help in the expense. Long clain^d that the German 
government had not shown any indication that it would 
accept the proposal. He also stated that "nonetheless, 
we are trying to get the neutral government to continue 
"initialled note in Long's files, container 203, 
Long Papers; see also House Rescue Commission Hearings, 
34-35; United Press Teletype [sic], 12 December 1943, in 
container 203, Long Papers. 
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in its activities." The Swedish government had offered 
in early 1943 to negotiate with the Germans for the 
release of 20,000 children who would remain in Sweden for 
the duration of the war provided that the U. S. and 
British governments shared in the cost of their upkeep. 
Although the British approved the plan in May, the 
American government never acted upon it. Long and his 
supporters in the State Department delayed approval for 
six months because they believed it was wrong to limit 
the offer to Jewish children. After the British offered 
to include Norwegian children, the State Department 
finally approved. By that time, however, neither the 
Swedish nor the German governments showed much interest. 
Long had continued to oppose any negotiations that would 
include the "enemy."15 
Long also informed the Committee that there was 
support for a plan to remove 100,000 children from Axis 
authority and the use of some type of "rehabilitation" 
program by neutral countries 
where they could get food and where we would 
put the food where the children could be 
nourished and brought back to something like a 
normal state of physical well-being and, when 
they had been there for 2 or 3 months and had 
gotten strong, they would go back home and some 
other children would come in. 
15House Rescue Commission Hearings, 29; see also 
Morse, While Six Million Died, 66-67. 
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This plan had actually been in operation for some time, 
but had not included Jewish children and other children 
held in Axis Europe.16 Another error made by Long during 
his testimony was his claim that the U. S. had accepted 
about 580,000 refugees "since the beginning of the Hitler 
regime." When Representative Mundt expressed shock about 
the number. Long reassured him that "except for the 
generous gestures...made with visitor and transit visas 
during the awful period, the immigration laws remained 
intact." Rescue advocates claimed that the actual number 
was about one half the one given by Long and that many of 
those refugees were not Jewish.17 
Long also attempted to tie together the admission of 
refugees and the unavailability of shipping. He claimed 
that fewer than 200 individuals a month could be 
accommodated with the transportation facilities that were 
available. Long had to be aware that such a claim was a 
total misrepresentation of the facts.18 He even claimed, 
16House Rescue Commission Hearings, 36; "Statement of 
the Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment, 2. 
17House Rescue Commission Hearings, 23, 29,40, 41; 
see also New York Times, 27 December, 11, and 31 
December, 14, 1943. See APPENDIX for the number of visas 
issued between 1933 and 1944. 
18House Rescue Commission Hearings, 22. The argument 
seems specious when quite often rescue ships did not 
carry as many individuals as they could: for example, in 
June 1943 a refugee rescue ship arrived in Philadelphia 
with space for 600 passengers but only carried 30 
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when questioned by Representative Mundt about the 
relationship between visa issuance, available shipping, 
and the possible limitations imposed by the State 
Department on the number of visas available, that "the 
movement of people had stopped."19 
The claim of the State Department in May 1943 that 
German submarine warfare was a real threat to the 
shipping of refugees20 no longer applied by the time Long 
gave his testimony to the Committee. Indeed, Winston 
Churchill had announced to the United States Congress at 
the same time that the Atlantic Ocean was free from any 
menace from German submarine warfare.21 
Long also used the argument that even humanitarian 
gestures, such as attempts to send food to the refugees 
in Nazi held territory, were of no avail. "If you send 
food," Long explained, "the Germans will take it and you 
contribute to the welfare and fighting strength of the 
passengers. See Friedman, No Haven, 194. At the Bermuda 
Conference discussions were held of the approximately 40 
passenger vessels available from neutral countries for 
refugee rescue and those discussions were in Long's 
files; see "Confidential Memorandum for the Chairman," 
Morning and Afternoon Sessions, 20 April 1943, Bermuda 
Conference, container 203, Long Papers. 
"House Rescue Commission Hearings, 22. 
20Deoartment of State Bulletin, 8(22 May 1943) : 456. 
21Washinqton Post, 2 0 May 1943, 1. 
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German Army."22 Interestingly, R. Borden Reams, Long's 
special advisor, had explained to Under Secretary 
Stettinius a month before that it had been considered 
unwise to permit "food to go to the oppressed Jews of 
Europe" because many of them "were acnually enemy 
aliens. . . . "23 
In reference to a question about the Struma incident 
in which 7 00 refugees had drowned off the coast of Turkey 
because che authorities had turned them away in an 
unseaworthy vessel. Long's response was that although the 
incident was "terrible" it was "one of those things that 
do happen." Moreover, that incident was concerned with 
the Palestine situation. Long added, and he stated he did 
not believe the refugee question and the Palestine 
question were to be considered together. More 
importantly, Long's testimony became more strident and he 
blamed the Jewish interest groups in the United States 
for the hampering of the refugee relief efforts. They 
had, he argued, exaggerated the plight of the Jews and 
thus excluded the suffering of other racial and ethnic 
groups. He was of the opinion that he and other members 
of the State Department could not "exclude persons from 
22House Rescue Commission Hearings, 36. 
23Copy of Memorandum of Reams to Stettinius, 8 
October 1943, in container 203, Long Papers. 
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our sympathy and our sympathetic attention if they are 
not Jews . "24 
The Coinmittee, and particularly Sol Bloom, was so 
pleased with Long's testimony that he requested that Long 
permit his testimony and the new mandate of the IGC to be 
made public. In December his observations were made 
known to the public.25 Almost immediately refugee 
advocates went on the attack :'6 
Long would not admit defeat. In fact, he believed 
so thoroughly in the impressiveness of his testimony that 
he expressed surprise at the attacks that were launched 
against him. He admitted to the American Jewish 
Committee and the PACPR ^ although 580,000 visas had 
been authorized that number was not the actual number 
granted.27 It should be remembered that it was State 
Department policy that limited the number of refugees 
permitted to enter the country; not action by Congress. 
Long, then, could not deny that the so-called "relative 
24House Rescue Commission Hearings, 44-45. 
2SNew York Times, 11 December 1943, 1; see also Long 
Diary, 12 December 1943 and 1 January 1944. 
26New York Evening Post, 11 December, 1, 3; 13 
December, 23; 14 December, 1; 20 December, 1, 3, 1943. 
See also New York Times,. 27 December, 11; and 31 
December, 14, 1943. 
27Joseph Proskauer to Long 28 December 1943 and Long 
to Proskauer 14 January 1944, container 203, Long Papers; 
Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 203. 
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rule" which kept out an incalculable number of refugees 
was the result of State Department executive policy. Yet 
he remained adamant. 
In fact, he maintained not only his innocence but 
also his correctness. In correspondence with his old 
friend and one time lieutenant, Avra Warren, Long was 
outraged that his integrity haa been questioned. 
I made a statement to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House which was subsequently 
printed and in the course of a long four-hour 
inquisition made "everal statements which were 
not accurate -- for I spoke without notes, from 
a memory of four years, without preparation and 
on one day's notice. It is remarkable that I 
did not make more inaccurate statements. But 
the radical press, always prone to attack me, 
and the Jewish press have turned their barrage 
against me and made life somewhat 
uncomfortable.... Anyhow I have written to Bloom 
a letter for the Committee which ought to 
straighten it out -- but it will not, because 
they have to have somebody to attack. On that 
basis I have been pilloried as an enemy of the 
Jew and as trying to discredit them. Their 
agitation depended on attacking some 
individual, otherwise they could have no 
publicity. So for the time being I am the 
bull's eye.28 
The public outcry against Long begged for his 
removal from the control of the refugee issue. Since the 
testimony coincided with his growing controversy with 
Morgenthau over the Riegner proposal, this marked in 
essence the end of Long's influence over refugee matters. 
28Avra Warren to Long, 15 December 1943, Long to Avra 
Warren, 7 January 1944, container 203, Long Papers; Long 
Diary, 1 January 1944. 
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He would remain in the State Department as an assistant 
Secretary for almost another year, serving in that 
capacity primarily as a liaison with Congress.29 
When the War Refugee Board was created in January 
1944, Long attempted to put as good a face as he could 
upon what was in essence a repudiation of his and the 
State Department's handling of the refugee problem. Long 
himself admitted to one of his critics that "In the 
security of the years to come, it may appear that the 
screening process was too rigorous." But he also argued 
that the process was necessary and "it avoided 
incalculable damage to the refugee cause."30 Proud to 
the end, however, he wrote his assessment of the War 
Refugee Board in his diary 10 days later. "What they can 
do I have not done I can not imagine." He could see only 
the political side of the issue. The War Refugee Board 
was "good," he wrote, "for l-vjal political reasons" 
because, as he saw it 
there are 4 million Jews in New York and its 
environs who feel themselves related to the 
refugees, because of the persecutions of the 
Jews, and who have been demanding special 
attention and treatment. This will encourage 
them in the thought the persecuted may be saved 
and possibly satisfy them politically -- but in 
29Long Diary, 1 January and 24 January 1944; see also 
Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridqe Long, xxiv. 
30Long to Proskauer, 14 January 1944, container 203, 
Long Papers. 
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my opinion [the Board] can not save any 
persecuted people we could not save under my 
recent and long suffering administration.31 
This diary entry reveals many of the failings of Long's 
administration of the refugee crisis. Even at this point 
he failed to admit the existence of the Final Solution. 
He likewise appeared to have believed that only Jews were 
interested in saving innocent victims of the Nazi 
atrocities. Of his own record Long believed 
it [spoke] for itself. I am satisfied and happy.... 
I do not consider myself a scholar -- rather a man 
of action -- perhaps somewhat slowed up by age. 
Of his immediate supervisor, Stettinius, Long believed 
the man 
no scholar, and is definitely a man of action - 
- but his methods, background and lack of 
experience grated on me. There is no 
alternative in such case but separation. . . . 
And we have arrived at the end of thac 
chapter.32 
His only regret while in office. Long wrote at the 
end of his service to the Government, was 
that a radical and selfish clique should have 
seen fit to attack me with viciousness and 
violence while I was engaged in a humanitarian 
activity and saving the hundreds of thousands 
of refugees. 
31Long Diary, 24 January 1944 
32Long Diary, 4 December 1944 
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Long concluded: "On that the record speaks for 
itself."33 Indeed, it does. 
33Long Diary, 31 August 1945 
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